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THE PII PROBLEM:
PRIVACY AND A NEW CONCEPT OF
PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE
INFORMATION
PAUL M. SCHWARTZ† & DANIEL J. SOLOVE‡
Personally identifiable information (PII) is one of the most central concepts in
information privacy regulation. The scope of privacy laws typically turns on
whether PII is involved. The basic assumption behind the applicable laws is that if
PII is not involved, then there can be no privacy harm. At the same time, there is no
uniform definition of PII in information privacy law. Moreover, computer science
has shown that in many circumstances non-PII can be linked to individuals, and
that de-identified data can be re-identified. PII and non-PII are thus not immutable
categories, and there is a risk that information deemed non-PII at one time can be
transformed into PII at a later juncture. Due to the malleable nature of what consti-
tutes PII, some commentators have even suggested that PII be abandoned as the
mechanism by which to define the boundaries of privacy law.
In this Article, we argue that although the current approaches to PII are flawed, the
concept of PII should not be abandoned. We develop a new approach called “PII
2.0,” which accounts for PII’s malleability. Based upon a standard rather than a
rule, PII 2.0 utilizes a continuum of risk of identification. PII 2.0 regulates informa-
tion that relates to either an “identified” or “identifiable” individual, and it estab-
lishes different requirements for each category. To illustrate this theory, we use the
example of regulating behavioral marketing to adults and children. We show how
existing approaches to PII impede the effective regulation of behavioral marketing,
and how PII 2.0 would resolve these problems.
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INTRODUCTION
Information privacy law has reached a turning point. The current
debate about the topic is vigorous, and polling data reveal that Ameri-
cans are extremely concerned about privacy, both on and off the
Internet.1 Moreover, the Executive Branch, independent agencies,
1 See Online Privacy: What Does It Mean to Parents and Kids?, COMMONSENSE MEDIA
(2010), http://www.commonsensemedia.org/sites/default/files/privacypoll.pdf (detailing
concerns of adults and youth regarding online privacy); U.S. Internet Users Ready To Limit
Online Tracking for Ads, GALLUP (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/145337/
Internet-Users-Ready-Limit-Online-Tracking-Ads.aspx (indicating that Internet users sup-
port limiting tracking measures that may impinge on their privacy).
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and Congress are all considering different paths to revitalize informa-
tion privacy.2 Yet, regardless of the nature of potential reforms, there
is a deeper problem: Information privacy law rests on the currently
unstable category of Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Infor-
mation that falls within this category is protected, and information
outside of it is not.
PII is one of the most central concepts in privacy regulation. It
defines the scope and boundaries of a large range of privacy statutes
and regulations. Numerous federal statutes turn on this distinction.3
Similarly, many state statutes also rely on PII as a jurisdictional
trigger.4 These laws all share the same basic assumption—that in the
absence of PII, there is no privacy harm. Thus, privacy regulation
focuses on the collection, use, and disclosure of PII, and leaves non-
PII unregulated.
Given PII’s importance, it is surprising that information privacy
law in the United States lacks a uniform definition of the term. In
addition, computer science has shown that the very concept of PII is
far from straightforward. Increasingly, technologists can take informa-
tion that appears on its face to be non-identifiable and turn it into
identifiable data.5 A recent law review article by Paul Ohm has also
challenged PII as a fatally flawed concept. In Ohm’s view, privacy law
must abandon its reliance on PII and find an entirely new paradigm
on which to regulate information privacy.6
2 Consider, for example, recent reports by the Department of Commerce and the
Federal Trade Commission on online privacy, which suggest that both entities plan to play
important and perhaps competing roles in this area. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INTERNET
POLICY TASK FORCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET
ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK (2010); FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING
CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE (2010) [hereinafter FTC, PROTECTING
PRIVACY].
3 Examples include the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6501–6506 (2006), the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§6801–6809, the Video
Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710, and the HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 226 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), discussed infra
Part I.B.
4 Examples include California’s Song-Beverly Credit Card Act, CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1747 (West 2009) and the breach notification laws that have now been enacted in forty-
six states, discussed infra Part I.B. For a discussion of the breach notification statutes,
which govern disclosure procedures for data security breaches, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE &
PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 135–39 (2011). For an up to date
listing of these statutes, see State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?TabId=13489 (last updated
Oct. 12, 2010).
5 See infra Part II.B (discussing ways in which data that is non-PII can be converted to
PII).
6 Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010).
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In contrast, this Article contends that information privacy law
needs a concept of PII, and thus cannot jettison PII as one of its cen-
tral dimensions. Rather, PII must be reconceptualized if privacy law is
to remain effective in the future. Therefore, we develop a new concep-
tion, PII 2.0, which avoids the problems and pitfalls of current
approaches. The key to our model is to build two categories of PII,
“identified” and “identifiable” data, and to treat them differently.7
This approach permits tailored legal protections built around different
levels of risk to individuals. It also represents a path forward, one that
avoids both the United States’ reductionist view of PII, and the
European Union’s expansionist view. In the reductionist view, the ten-
dency is to consider PII as only that personal data that has been spe-
cifically associated with a specific person. That model protects only
identified data, and thereby leaves too much personal information
without legal protections. In the expansionist approach, it is irrelevant
if information has already been linked to a particular person, or might
be so linked in the future; this view treats identified and identifiable
data as equivalent. Rather than follow the path of these two
approaches, we argue that the continuum of risk is different for these
categories. The result is that the necessary legal protections should
generally be different for identified and identifiable data.
This Article proceeds in four steps. In Part I, we explore the cen-
tral role of PII and the grounds for its current uneasy status. The con-
cept of PII arose only during the last fifty years and was tied to the
development of the computer. Computerized record systems and tech-
niques of digital data analysis permitted new ways to link data to
people. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Congress struggled with
questions regarding the proper organization of a set of first-generation
information privacy statutes. It was only in the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 19848 that Congress settled on the classic model for
these laws: It would solely be an entity’s collection or processing of
PII that would obligate it to provide privacy safeguards.9 As Part I
also demonstrates, there is still neither a standard nomenclature for
PII nor a standard definition of it in the United States. We explore the
three basic approaches of American lawmakers to defining PII and
find the current formulations of PII to be deeply unsatisfactory.
7 See infra Part IV.D (discussing differences between “identified” and “identifiable”
data).
8 Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2780 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 521
(2006)).
9 See infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text (discussing the Cable Act and the new
model for privacy safety statutes).
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In Part II, we engage in a broader analysis of the weaknesses of
PII as it is conceptualized today. First, many people believe in an
“anonymity myth,”—that is, a belief that individuals remain anony-
mous if they have not formally used their name. This belief is espe-
cially prevalent for cyberspace activity. Yet, the growth of static IP
addresses and other developments creates some built-in identifiability
when one enters cyberspace. Second, information that is initially non-
PII can be transformed into PII. Third, technology itself is constantly
evolving, which means that the line between PII and non-PII is not
fixed but rather depends upon changing technological developments.
Fourth, the ability to distinguish PII from non-PII is frequently
contextual. Many kinds of information are not inherently non-
identifiable, or identifiable as an abstract matter.
In Part III, we use behavioral marketing, with a special emphasis
on food marketing to children, as a test case for demonstrating the
notable flaws in the current definitions of PII. In behavioral mar-
keting, companies generally do not track individuals by name. Rather,
they use software to construct personal profiles that exclude names
but nonetheless contain a wealth of details about the individual.
Companies have also tried to short-circuit the discussion of legal
reforms through the simple argument that they do not collect PII.
Digital marketing is also focused on youth.10 Due to the epidemic
of obesity among minors in the United States, the targeted marketing
of unhealthy food products to youth is now a highly significant public
health issue. The key statute in this regard, the Children’s Online
Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),11 restricts websites from gathering
and using information obtained from children. Yet, COPPA has weak-
nesses that permit companies to argue that they are engaging in
behavioral marketing without using PII, and hence that their conduct
does not fall under this statute.
In its final Part, this Article develops an approach to redefining
PII based on the rule-standard dichotomy. Drawing on legal scholar-
ship that has explored this distinction in other settings, we develop a
model for PII 2.0 around a standard-based approach. A standard is an
open-ended decision-making tool, while a rule is a harder-edged
benchmark.12 In our revitalized standard, PII 2.0 regulates informa-
tion that relates to either an “identified” or “identifiable” individual,
but fixes different legal requirements for each category. We conclude
10 See infra Part III.B (discussing the increase in food marketing to youth).
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2006).
12 See infra Part IV.B (differentiating between rules and standards in the context of
their use in legislation defining PII).
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by demonstrating the merits of this new approach in the context of
behavioral marketing and food marketing to youth.
I
PII’S CENTRAL ROLE AND UNEASY STATUS
In this Part, we examine how and why PII became a central con-
cept in information privacy law. Due to the rise in the computer’s
processing of data, Congress was forced to decide the kinds of data to
which information privacy law would apply. Despite legislative grap-
pling with this issue for several decades, there is still no uniform defi-
nition of PII in the U.S. We identify three current models of PII and
demonstrate why each is inadequate.
A. The Rise of PII and Its Significance
In the last fifty years, PII went from a nearly irrelevant part of
privacy law to one of its most central concepts. The early jurispru-
dence of privacy law lacked any concept of PII as a stand-alone cate-
gory. In their famous 1890 article, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
merely assumed that privacy regulation would always involve informa-
tion identifiable to a person.13 They conceived of privacy as a right of
“personality.”14 Although the two authors did not define this concept
in any detail, they drew on continental philosophy to argue that every
person deserves protection against certain kinds of harms as a conse-
quence of her status as a human.15 The paradigmatic privacy invasion
for Warren and Brandeis concerned the press intruding on the privacy
of individuals by printing gossip about them.16 Warren and Brandeis
viewed such media reports as necessarily concerning information that
would identify a person; otherwise, the gossip would have no sting.
13 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
14 Id. at 205. As Warren and Brandeis wrote: “The principle which protects personal
writings and all other personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation,
but against publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but
that of an inviolate personality.” Id. For a discussion of this conception of privacy as a right
of personality, see Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nicholas Peifer, Prosser’s Privacy and the
German Right of Personality: Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept?, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1925, 1943–44 (2010).
15 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 13, at 205. In their view, as later summarized by
Robert Post, a privacy tort was necessary in order to protect each person’s “emotional
integrity.” Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and
Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 662–63 (1991). For many years after Warren
and Brandeis’s article, “other authors on the subject of [tort] privacy also rallied around
the notion of the right of personality as the basis for” privacy interests. Schwartz & Peifer,
supra note 14, 1944–47.
16 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 13, at 196.
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They thus did not consider PII as an issue warranting any special
attention or elaboration.
A later turning point in privacy law occurred in 1960 when
William Prosser published his classic article organizing privacy tort
law into four categories.17 Unlike Warren and Brandeis, who built
their right of privacy on concepts borrowed from European philos-
ophy, Prosser was content to develop a series of straightforward classi-
fications that over time were able to take on a doctrinal function.18
Like Warren and Brandeis, however, he left unexplored the issue of
PII. Prosser merely assumed that the privacy torts applied only when
an identified person was involved.19
PII first became an issue in the 1960s with the rise of the com-
puter, which permitted public bureaucracies and private companies to
process personal data.20 The computer did not merely increase the
amount of information that entities collected—it changed how that
data could be organized, accessed, and searched. A 1977 report from
the Privacy Protection Study Commission, a federal blue-ribbon com-
mission, noted that “the physical organization of the records in the
database, as well as the physical organization of the items of data
within the record, are ceasing to be limiting factors on the way data or
records are stored or retrieved.”21 Unlike manual systems, such as
telephone books, “computers [could] easily be programmed to sort or
reorganize data on the basis of any particular index, attribute, or char-
acteristic.”22 The key point, as the Commission noted, was that com-
puters permitted information to be searched and organized by
multiple attributes rather than simply through a single index, as, for
example, a person’s first and last name.23 This capacity of computers
changed the way information could be linked to an individual.
17 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
18 Id. at 389–407. For a discussion of the doctrinal role of Prosser’s concept of tort
privacy, see G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
158–61 (2003).
19 See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 17, at 392–98 (providing examples of privacy invasions,
all of which involve identified persons).
20 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1402 (2001). For classic early studies in
American social sciences and law that trace this connection between the computer and
privacy concerns, see generally ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY:
COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS (1971) and ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM (1967).
21 PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY
app. 5: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY 21 (1977) [hereinafter PRIVACY COMM’N,
TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY].
22 Id.
23 Id. at 21–22. In his prescient study, The Assault on Privacy, Miller also discusses
computers’ so-called retrieval capacity, which is the ability of computers to filter through
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Previously, in order for information to be connected to people, it
would almost invariably have to contain their name or likeness.
Computerized record systems and techniques of data aggregation and
analysis enabled many more pieces of personal data to become link-
able to individuals.
This development obliged policymakers to explore a novel set of
issues regarding the kinds of information and the nature of the link-
ages that should trigger the application of information privacy law.
The Privacy Protection Study Commission noted that computer sys-
tems were capable of retrieving information by searches through
databases that were free of indexing around an “individual identi-
fier.”24 The Commission did not discuss the issue in terms of PII, but
rather as “who and what is to be covered.”25 No longer was it possible
to assume privacy could be protected solely by safeguarding informa-
tion involving a person’s name or likeness. The scope of information
requiring privacy protection became significantly larger—and also less
clear and more contestable. Thus, the development of computerized
records required Congress to confront the issue of the kinds of infor-
mation that should matter for information privacy law.
In its initial legislative strategy, Congress viewed the types of
records at stake as determinative in triggering a statute’s protections.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970,26 the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974,27 and the
Privacy Act of 197428 demonstrate this approach as well as its
attendant weaknesses.
FCRA was the first federal privacy law to respond to computer-
ization and digital records. It applies to any “consumer reporting
agency” (CRA) that furnishes a “consumer report.”29 A consumer
report is any communication by a CRA that bears on a consumer’s
credit worthiness or personal characteristics when used to establish
the consumer’s eligibility for credit, insurance, or for a limited set of
other purposes.30 FRCA sets legal restrictions on the circumstances
under which a CRA can furnish a consumer report to another party,
as well as the use of these reports for purposes such as law
large amounts of information, and highlights the relevant dangers thereof. MILLER, supra
note 20, at 39.
24 PRIVACY COMM’N, TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY, supra note 21, at 45.
25 Id. at 44.
26 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2006).
27 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006).
28 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
29 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a).
30 Id. § 1681a(d)(1).
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enforcement and employment offers.31 In sum, the statute focuses
both on the organization of data about an individual (namely, whether
that data appears in a “consumer report”) and on the party who col-
lects and uses the information (the CRA).32 Of the two categories, the
concept of the consumer report is the most important.33 Moreover,
due to FCRA’s definitional approach, there are notable gaps in its
coverage.34
Enacted four years after FCRA, FERPA focuses on student pri-
vacy. It was also the first federal statute to refer to “personally identi-
fiable information.”35 FERPA uses the term when prohibiting
educational entities from releasing or providing access to “any person-
ally identifiable information in education records.”36 Despite its men-
tioning of PII, however, the statute’s central concept is “education
records” rather than PII.37 FERPA defines education records as
“information directly related to a student” that an educational institu-
tion itself “maintain[s]” in a file or other record.38 Thus, the statute’s
31 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 4, at 86–91.
32 Id.; see also PRACTISING LAW INST., PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY 2-7 to 2-14 (Kristen J.
Mathews ed., 2011) (hereinafter PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY) (defining “consumer report”
and “credit reporting agency” and discussing how these terms operate under FCRA).
33 As Proskauer on Privacy observes, “[g]iven that the definition of a CRA depends
largely on the definition of ‘consumer report,’ the fact that a particular set of information is
not a consumer report can prevent a person or entity from acting as a CRA for the pur-
poses of the Act.” PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY, supra note 32, at 2-11.
34 The statute makes clear, for example, that it does not apply to a party, such as a
bank, that furnishes financial information that goes into a consumer report. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681a(d)(2)(A)(i) (2006). For case law reaching this conclusion, see Mirfasihi v. Fleet
Mortg. Corp., 551 F.3d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 2008) and Smith v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta,
837 F.2d 1575, 1578 (11th Cir. 1988). Although such entities provide a CRA with informa-
tion about consumers, they themselves are not in the business of supplying a consumer
report to third parties. FCRA contains another problematic and explicit exception to its
definition of consumer report. This term does not extend to the sharing of information
among affiliated entities, so long as the consumer is given an opportunity to opt out of such
sharing. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(iii).
In Congressional testimony in 2003, Joel Reidenberg pointed to the consequences of
this exemption: It “means that credit report information loses protection when shared with
far-flung related companies.” Affiliate Sharing Practices and Their Relationship to the Fair
Credit Reporting Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs,
108th Cong. 8 (2003) (statement of Joel R. Reidenberg, Professor, Fordham University
School of Law).
35 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2) (2006). While Congress does not define PII in the statute, a
federal regulation provides a broad approach to it. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2010) (defining
PII to include a student’s name, address, and social security number, as well as several
other “indirect identifiers”).
36 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2).
37 Id.
38 Id. § 1232g(a)(4)(A)(i)–(ii).
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coverage depends on whether or not a school has first organized and
then stored data in education records.39
Due to FERPA’s limitations, schools long profited by distributing
“surveys” on behalf of marketers.40 Since the collected information
went from parents and children to marketers without being “main-
tain[ed]” in “educational records” by schools, this practice fell outside
of FERPA’s coverage.41 Congress finally responded to this practice in
a limited fashion in 2005. It left FERPA unaltered, but created a lim-
ited separate statutory interest that permits parents of elementary and
secondary school students to opt out of the collection of student infor-
mation for commercial purposes.42 Congress neither revisited
FERPA’s reliance on the concept of “educational records,” nor cre-
ated a more basic right to block the release of student records for
commercial purposes. As for universities, they remain able to sell
essential student contact information to credit card companies;43 such
data is considered “directory information,” and hence not an “educa-
tion[al] record[ ].”44
In a fashion similar to FCRA and FERPA, the Privacy Act’s
threshold turns on how record systems are organized rather than on
whether information could be linked to an individual. The key trigger
of the Privacy Act concerns how federal agencies retrieve information
from a database; it applies only when information is retrieved from a
“system of records.”45 The Act defines a “system of records” as “a
group of any records . . . from which information is retrieved by the
name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or
other identifying particular assigned to the individual.”46 As a
39 JAMES RAPP, 5 EDUCATION LAW § 13.04[7][a] (2010). The Supreme Court has also
heard the siren call of protection based on type of record rather than individual iden-
tifiability. In 2002, in Owasso Independent School District v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002), the
Supreme Court went further than even FERPA’s statutory language and strongly sug-
gested in dicta that FERPA records are only those kept in a permanent file and by a “cen-
tral custodian” at the school. Id. at 434–35.
40 Lynn M. Daggett, FERPA in the Twenty-First Century: Failure To Effectively
Regulate Privacy for All Students, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 100–01 (2008).
41 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(6).
42 Daggett, supra note 40, at 78–79. Regarding these changes, Congress placed modest
limits on the ability of elementary and secondary schools to collect and disclose student
information for commercial purposes. While schools must give parents an opportunity to
opt out of such sharing, the law does not ban sharing for commercial purposes and does
not require affirmative consent from parents. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 367–68 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(j)(1) (2006)).
43 Daggett, supra note 40, at 89.
44 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2).
45 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (2006).
46 Id. A record includes “any item, collection, or grouping of information about an
individual that is maintained by an agency . . . and that contains his name, or the identifying
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\86-6\NYU603.txt unknown Seq: 11 28-NOV-11 15:01
1824 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:1814
consequence, the Privacy Act only covers computer searches that
identify an individual when retrieval of data is done through reference
to a specific personal identifier, such as a name or Social Security
Number.47
Like FERPA, the Privacy Act remains an antiquated law that
misses the significance of the computer search revolution—namely,
the ability of computers to investigate, analyze, and manipulate data
sets and to find new ways to locate specific persons. As an example of
an action that is not covered by the Privacy Act, a federal agency that
examines its computer records by a search around psychiatric diag-
nosis, age, or other personal attributes is not retrieving data from a
system of records by use of an identifying particular assigned to a
person.48 Within three years of the statute’s enactment, the Privacy
Protection Study Commission had already drawn attention to and
condemned this profound flaw.49 Nonetheless, over thirty years after
enactment of the Privacy Act, Congress still has not corrected this
central failing of the statute.
Finally, in 1984, with the passage of the Cable Communications
Policy Act (Cable Act), Congress reached an important milestone.50
The statute not only refers to PII, but also makes PII the trigger for
the applicability of the law.51 The innovation of the Cable Act was to
tie the presence of PII to an obligation to follow Fair Information
Practices (FIPs), which are the building blocks of modern information
number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger
or voice print or a photograph.” Id. § 552a(a)(4).
47 As the Department of Justice’s guide to the Privacy Act summarizes, “[t]he highly
technical ‘system of records’ definition is perhaps the single most important Privacy Act
concept, because . . . it makes coverage under the Act dependent upon the method of
retrieval of a record rather than its substantive content.” DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OVERVIEW OF
THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, at 25 (2010) (emphasis added).
48 See OMB Privacy Act Implementation, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,952 (July 9, 1975)
(defining “system of records” as limited to “information [that] is retrieved by the name of
the individual or by some . . . other identifying particular assigned to the individual”);
PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974: AN ASSESSMENT 6–7 (1974),
available at http://epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report/appendix4.html (providing an example
of a Veterans’ Administration search by psychiatric diagnosis that was not covered by the
Act).
49 PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY
59–61 (1977) [hereinafter PRIVACY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY].
50 Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.).
51 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(1)(A) (2006). Nevertheless, the legislative history of the Cable
Act proves singularly unhelpful regarding the selection of this term as the trigger for the
statute’s coverage. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 76–79 (1984) (stating only that PII “would
include specific information about the subscriber, or a list of names and addresses on which
the subscriber is included, but does not include aggregate information about subscribers
which does not identify particular persons”).
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privacy law. FIPs establish obligations for organizations that process
personal information.52 The Cable Act prohibits a cable operator
using a cable system from collecting PII “concerning any subscriber
without the prior written or electronic consent of the subscriber con-
cerned.”53 It provides for subscriber access to all PII “regarding that
subscriber which is collected and maintained by a cable operator.”54 It
further requires that subscribers be given notice about the nature of
PII “collected or to be collected with respect to the subscriber and the
nature of the use of such information.”55
There is a clear difference between the Cable Act and FCRA,
FERPA, and the Privacy Act. The Cable Act does not extend its pro-
tections based on how information is assembled, whether in a credit
record, as in FCRA, an educational record, as in FERPA, or a “system
of records,” as in the Privacy Act. Rather, the Cable Act’s statutory
obligations fall on a cable operator as soon as the operator collects
PII.
What inspired this important shift in the law between the early
1970s and 1984? First, there was a renewed focus in society on infor-
mation privacy during the latter part of the 1970s. Google Ngram pro-
vides a convincing demonstration of this development; this Google
database permits statistical analysis of the frequency of use of specific
words and phrases.56 A Google Ngram search of the term “informa-
tion privacy” reveals an increase in attention to the topic beginning in
the late 1970s and continuing during the run-up to the enactment of
the Cable Act.57
Part of this attention was driven, in turn, by the arrival of George
Orwell’s titular year, 1984. A flurry of media reports and law review
52 In the United States, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare had first
mentioned FIPs in an influential report in 1973. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE, RECORDS COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS xxi, xxiii, xxix–xxx (1973).
On the policy history of FIPs, see PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 73–86
(1995). For an introduction to FIPs, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ,
INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 655–58 (3d ed., 2009) [hereinafter SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ,
IPL], and Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 907–08 (2009).
53 47 U.S.C. § 551(b)(1). Note, however, that personal information about programming
choices is not protected, see infra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
54 47 U.S.C. § 551(d).
55 Id. § 551(a)(1)(A).
56 The Ngram Viewer, a tool launched by Google Labs, creates a graphical year-by-
year representation of how often a phrase has been used in books. It draws on nearly 5.2
million books from a period between 1500 and 2000 A.D., which the Google Library
Project has digitalized. Patricia Cohen, In 500 Billion Words, New Window on Culture,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010, at A3.
57 Appendix A to this Article contains the Ngram Viewer’s chart for this term between
1950 and 2000. The chart also shows how this attention only intensified throughout the
1990s with the emergence of the Internet and other threats to privacy. Infra App. A.
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articles marked this occasion with an analysis of new threats to pri-
vacy.58 Thus, this notable literary year helped to heighten the concern
about privacy in the United States.
Perhaps most importantly, however, cable operators’ collection of
personal information created the same kinds of issues that the
Internet would later raise. Even as early as the 1980s, observers noted
that cable would permit a user not only to receive information, as
broadcast television long had allowed, but also to respond to informa-
tion on the screen and make programming choices.59 By collecting
these data, the cable operator would be able to construct detailed
profiles about viewing choices. Moreover, it was anticipated that cable
would provide “videotex,” which was envisioned as a two-way com-
munication system permitting users to access information directly
from their service provider’s computers.60 A “videotex explosion”
would lead, in turn, to the conveying of detailed data about one’s
“interests, choices and views to the central computer” of the system
operator.61 Due to legislative concerns about these practices, the
policy response in the Cable Act was to regulate around information,
rather than around how data was organized. This regulatory insight,
58 As one law review article stated, “[t]o prevent cable from turning the television set
into an Orwellian nightmare, the [Cable] Act creates a framework for the protection of
subscriber privacy.” Michael I. Meyerson, The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984:
A Balancing Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. REV. 543, 612 (1985); see also John
Shattuck, In the Shadow of 1984: National Identification Systems, Computer-Matching, and
Privacy in the United States, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 991 (1984) (“Recent actions by the
federal government ha[d] brought the technology . . . invasion from the realm of science
fiction into the real world of public policy.”); Mindy E. Wachtel, Note, Videotex: A
Welcome New Technology or an Orwellian Threat to Privacy?, 2 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 287, 311 (1983) (noting that a two-way cable system “could quickly destroy individual
privacy by filtering vast quantities of intimate information to commercially exploitive
enterprises, overzealous government enforcement officials or the idly curious”).
For illustrative accounts of threats to privacy in the popular press in 1983 and 1984
that also discussed Orwell’s famous novel, see Walter Cronkite, Orwell’s ‘1984’—Nearing?,
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1983, at E23, Thomas Ferraro, Is an Orwellian Society Upon Us?, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 1983, at D31, and John J. Fialka, The Time Has Come for Deciding if 1984
Will Resemble 1984, WALL ST. J., June 7, 1983, at 1, 17.
59 As Meyerson noted in 1985:
[A]dvanced cable systems are able to monitor continually the viewing choices
of each cable household. This capability presents a serious potential for
invading the privacy of the cable subscriber. Not only can intimate information
be gleaned easily by the cable operator, but an unprecedented amount and
variety of information about an individual can also be inexpensively accumu-
lated from one source—the cable system.
Meyerson, supra note 58, at 612.
60 See Wachtel, supra note 58, at 287–88 (describing videotex and its potential for infor-
mation sharing).
61 Id. at 290.
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once reached, established the model for information privacy regula-
tion to come.
After enactment of the Cable Act, information privacy law con-
tinued to use the collection of PII as the trigger for applicability of
legal protection. Congress and the states developed a series of privacy
laws around the concept of PII.62 These laws failed to settle, however,
on a standard nomenclature for PII. To this day, information privacy
law scholars use the alternative term, “personal information,” quite
frequently and sometimes interchangeably with PII.63 Nevertheless,
PII has become the preferred term of art since the mid-1990s.
Even more troublesome than the inconsistent nomenclature,
information privacy law has failed to develop a coherent and workable
definition of PII. Although the concept gained ascendency over the
past two decades, and has become the central device for determining
the scope of privacy laws, scant intellectual attention has been given to
the theory behind the term. A variety of definitions of PII have arisen
in privacy laws, but with little thought as to the selection of one over
the others. In other words, the complexities of PII have not been ade-
quately explored. As we will discuss in the next Section, moreover, all
of these definitions are flawed.
PII is a challenging conceptual issue at the heart of any system of
regulating privacy in the Information Age. If PII is defined too nar-
rowly, then it will fail to protect privacy in light of modern technolo-
gies involving data mining and behavioral marketing. Technology will
thus make privacy law irrelevant and obsolete. On the other hand, if
PII is defined too broadly, then it could encompass too much informa-
tion, and threaten to transform privacy law into a cumbersome and
unworkable regulation of nearly all information. Privacy law must
have coherent boundaries, which adequately protect privacy and
which can be flexible and evolving.
But PII is complicated and hard to pin down. Computer science
has shown that the concept of PII is far from straightforward. Increas-
ingly, technologists can take information that appears on its face to be
62 For illustrative laws, see Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6501–6506 (2006), Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006), Driver’s
Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2006), and Information Practices Act of
1977, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.82, 1798.84 (2008).
63 For two examples, compare William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and
Identity in Social Marketing, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1135 (2009) (using “personal infor-
mation” in place of PII), with Robert Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities:
Protecting Personal Identifying Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws,
9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 91, 92 (2009) (using “personal information” interchangeably with
PII).
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non-identifiable and turn it into identifiable data.64 Moreover, the
marketing industry is involved in practices that raise privacy concerns,
but that do not fall within any of the current definitions of PII.65
While the edifice of privacy law is built on PII, only recently has
some awareness emerged about this core conceptual problem. In 2010,
the FTC finally recognized the extent of the PII problem. In a major
report, it acknowledged “the blurring of the distinction between per-
sonally identifiable information and supposedly anonymous or de-
identified information.”66 The FTC pointed to the need to rethink PII,
but did not make any headway beyond this request.67 In the scholarly
literature, moreover, there has been surprisingly scant attention paid
to the issue of PII. In 1998, Jerry Kang devoted several pages in a
seminal early paper about Internet privacy to a discussion of when
data became “personal information.”68 More recently, Paul Ohm pub-
lished a major piece devoted to arguing that we abandon the very con-
cept of PII. For Ohm, PII is a fatally flawed concept because so much
non-PII can be re-identified.69 If the PII problem remains unresolved,
then we will continue to lack a coherent approach to defining the
proper boundaries of privacy regulation. Privacy law thus depends
upon addressing the PII problem—it can no longer remain the unac-
knowledged elephant in the room.
B. The Current Typology of PII
Given the ubiquity of the concept in privacy law and the impor-
tant role it plays, the definition of PII is crucial. But instead of
defining PII in a coherent and consistent manner, privacy law offers
multiple competing definitions, each with some significant problems
and limitations. There are three predominant approaches to defining
PII in various laws and regulations. We will refer to these approaches
as (1) the “tautological” approach, (2) the “non-public” approach, and
(3) the “specific-types” approach.
64 See infra Part II.B (describing means by which data can be made identifiable).
65 See infra Part III.A (discussing behavioral marketing and the concerns it poses for
privacy).
66 FTC, PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 2, at iv.
67 In this report, the FTC stated that it would leave open the question of the feasibility
of a proposed definition of PII centered on data that can be “reasonably linked to a spe-
cific consumer, computer, or other device.” Id. at 43. The FTC’s concern was whether such
a definition was “feasible, particularly with respect to data that, while not currently consid-
ered ‘linkable,’ may become so in the future.” Id.
68 Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193,
1206–11 (1998).
69 Ohm, supra note 6, at 1742.
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At the start of this examination of the current definitions of PII, a
brief introduction to the jurisprudence of rules and standards is in
order. A standard is an open-ended yardstick for decision making, and
a rule, its counterpart, is a harder-edged decision-making tool.70 To
illustrate, consider the possibilities under the rule/standard dichotomy
for regulating the behavior of an automobile driver at a train crossing:
(1) stop, look, and listen (the rule), or (2) proceed with reasonable
caution (the standard).71 The existing approaches to defining PII can
be categorized as either rules or standards. The first two of our cate-
gories fall into the legal category of a standard, and the last one, a
rule.
1. The Tautological Approach
The tautological approach is an example of a standard, and
defines PII as any information that identifies a person. The Video
Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) neatly demonstrates this model.72 The
VPPA, which safeguards the privacy of video sales and rentals, simply
defines “personally identifiable information” as “information which
identifies a person.”73 For purposes of the statute, information that
identifies a person is PII and falls under the statute’s jurisdiction once
linked to the purchase, request, or obtaining of video material.
The virtue of the tautological approach, like that of other kinds of
standards, is that it is open rather than closed in nature. As a standard,
it can evolve and remain flexible in response to new developments.
The problem with the tautological approach, however, is that it fails to
define PII or explain how it is to be singled out. At its core, this
approach simply states that PII is PII. As a result, this definition is
unhelpful in distinguishing PII from non-PII.
2. The Non-Public Approach
A second approach to defining PII is to focus on non-public infor-
mation. Here, too, we see the use of a standard. The non-public
70 For a discussion of the distinction between rules and standards, see Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592–93 (1988), and Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term: Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57–59 (1992).
71 These examples follow from two Supreme Court decisions: Pokora v. Wabash Ry.,
292 U.S. 98, 101–02 (1934), and Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70
(1927).
72 Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006).
73 Id. § 2710(a)(3). The VPPA prohibits “videotape service providers” from knowingly
disclosing personal information, such as the titles of items rented or purchased, without the
individual’s written consent. It defines “videotape service providers” in a technologically
neutral fashion to permit the law to be extended to DVDs. Id. § 2710(a)(4).
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approach seeks to define PII by focusing on what it is not, rather than
on what it is. In a sense, this approach is simply a variant of the tauto-
logical approach. Instead of saying that PII is simply that which identi-
fies a person, the non-public approach draws on concepts of
information that is publicly accessible and information that is purely
statistical. This model would exclude information that falls in these
two categories from PII, but the relevant legislation does not explore
or develop the logic behind this approach.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) epitomizes one aspect of
this approach by defining “personally identifiable financial informa-
tion” as “nonpublic personal information.”74 The statute fails to
define “nonpublic,” but presumably this term means information not
found within the public domain.75 In an illustration of another aspect
of this approach, the Cable Act defines PII as something other than
“aggregate data.”76 This statute, which protects the privacy of sub-
scribers to cable services, views PII as excluding “any record of aggre-
gate data which does not identify particular persons.”77 By aggregate
data, the Cable Act presumably means purely statistical information
that does not identify specific individuals.78
The problem with the non-public approach is that it does not map
onto whether the information is in fact identifiable. The public or pri-
vate status of data often does not match up to whether it can identify a
person or not. For example, a person’s name and address, which
clearly identify an individual, nevertheless might be considered public
information, as such information is typically listed in telephone books.
In many cases, however, individuals have non-public data that they do
not want matched to this allegedly public information. Yet, an
approach that only protects non-public information as PII might not
preclude such combinations.
74 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4)(A) (2006).
75 During GLBA rulemaking proceedings, financial regulatory agencies “wrestled with
the concept of nonpublic personal information” before ultimately focusing their concept of
“nonpublic” on whether personal information was “publicly available.” Charles M. Horn,
Financial Services Privacy at the Start of the 21st Century: A Conceptual Perspective, 5 N.C.
BANKING INST. 89, 107–08 (2001). In this context, Horn adds, “publicly available” informa-
tion includes “any information that a financial institution has a ‘reasonable basis’ to believe
is lawfully available to the general public from federal, state or local governmental records,
widely distributed media (including the Internet), or disclosures to the general public
required to be made by federal, state or local law.” Id. at 107.
76 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(2)(A) (2006).
77 Id.
78 The number of Comcast customers in Virginia who subscribe to HBO is an example
of aggregate data under the Cable Act.
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3. The Specific-Types Approach
The third approach is to list specific types of data that constitute
PII. This approach is a classic example of a rule. In the context of the
specific-types approach, if information falls into an enumerated cate-
gory, it becomes per se PII by operation of the statute. To illustrate
three different variations on this approach, we will examine
Massachusetts’s breach notification statute of 2007 (officially titled the
Standards for the Protection of Personal Information of Residents of
the Commonwealth),79 California’s Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of
1971,80 and the federal Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA) of 1998.81
The Massachusetts breach notification statute requires that indi-
viduals be notified if a defined set of their personal information is lost
or leaked.82 The Act defines PII as a person’s first name and last
name, or first initial and last name in combination with either a social
security number, driver’s license number, financial account number,
or credit or debit card number.83
The Song-Beverly Act prohibits merchants who accept credit
cards from collecting a cardholder’s “personal identification informa-
tion” when transacting business with her.84 More specifically, it pro-
hibits retailers from requesting or requiring “as a condition to
accepting the credit card” that a cardholder provide “any personal
identification information upon the credit card transaction form or
otherwise.”85 The critical language in the Act defines PII as “informa-
tion concerning the cardholder, other than information set forth on
the credit card, and including, but not limited to, the cardholder’s
address and telephone number.”86
Finally, COPPA, a federal statute, regulates the collection and
use of children’s information by Internet websites or online services.87
Like the Massachusetts statute, it approaches the question of PII
versus non-PII in a typological fashion. COPPA states that personal
information is “individually identifiable information about an
79 201 MASS. CODE REGS. § 17.00 (2010).
80 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747 (2009).
81 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006).
82 E.g., 201 MASS. CODE REGS. § 17.04.
83 Id. § 17.02.
84 Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08 (2009). Note that
the Act uses the term “personal identification information.” This language reinforces our
earlier point that there is no standard nomenclature for PII. See supra notes 62–63 and
accompanying text.
85 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(a)(1).
86 Id. § 1747.08(b).
87 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2006).
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individual collected online,” including first and last name, physical
address, social security number, telephone number, and e-mail
address.88 This law’s definition of PII also includes “any other identi-
fier that the [Federal Trade Commission (FTC)] determines permits
the physical or online contacting of a specific individual.”89 In 2000,
the FTC issued its COPPA Rule.90 It added one element to the Act’s
definition of PII by extending this concept to a “persistent identifier,
such as a customer number held in a cookie or a processor serial
number, where such identifier is associated with individually identifi-
able information.”91
An initial problem with the specific-types approach is that it can
be quite restrictive in how it defines PII. The Massachusetts statute
defines PII to include only a narrow set of data elements: a name plus
other elements, such as a social security number, a driver’s license
number, or a financial account number.92 This list is under-inclusive:
There are numerous other kinds of information that, along with a
person’s name, would serve specifically to reveal one’s identity. For
example, a person’s name and sensitive personal medical information
would, in many cases, permit the identification of that person.
Moreover, most individuals would consider such a data breach to be a
significant event and one about which they would wish to be
informed. Yet, this leak appears to fall outside the kind of PII that the
Massachusetts breach notification statute covers. The Massachusetts
version of the specific-types approach also assumes that the types of
data that are identifiable to a person are static—the statute does not
cover information that could potentially become personally identifi-
able. As we will argue later in this Article, however, this assumption is
false.93 This variant of the specific-types approach is too rigid to ade-
quately protect personal privacy.
As for the version of the specific-types approach in the Song-
Beverly Act, its text appears far less narrow than that of the
Massachusetts statute. Nonetheless, a recent series of decisions
regarding the Act demonstrates how easy it is for PII to be interpreted
only as information exclusive to one person. Two lower courts in
California have interpreted this statute as providing extremely limited
88 Id. § 6501(8)(A)–(E).
89 Id. § 6501(8)(F).
90 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2011).
91 Id.
92 201 MASS. CODE REGS. § 17.02 (2010).
93 See infra Part II (arguing that the distinction between PII and non-PII changes with
context, technology, and availability of apparently anonymous data).
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protection.94 While the California Supreme Court in 2011 corrected
the lower courts’ interpretations of the statute, the general flaw of the
specific-types approach remains even after this decision.95
The litigation in question, Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma, involved a
suit for violation of the Song-Beverly Act. Plaintiff Jessica Pineda vis-
ited defendant’s store in San Diego County, selected an item to
purchase, and then went to the cashier to pay for it with her credit
card. As the Superior Court indicated, “[t]he cashier asked her for her
zip code, but did not tell her the consequences if she declined to pro-
vide the information.”96 Pineda believed that she was obliged to pro-
vide this information to complete the transaction, and she supplied it
to the cashier.97 The cashier recorded the zip code in the electronic
cash register, which meant that the store now had the following infor-
mation in its database: the customer’s credit card number, the name
on her credit card, and her zip code.98
As we have noted above, the critical language in the Song-
Beverly Act defines PII as “information concerning the cardholder,
other than information set forth on the credit card, and including, but
not limited to, the cardholder’s address and telephone number.”99
While this language appears broad, the appellate court in Pineda fol-
lowed the trial court in deciding that the Song-Beverly Act defined
PII only as data that was “facially specific” to the individual, such as
an entire address, including the zip code, but not exclusively a zip
code.100 As the appellate court declared, the statute defined PII as
data that was “specific in nature regarding an individual, rather than a
group identifier such as a zip code.”101 For that court, “a zip code
[was] not facially individualized information.”102 This judgment meant
that information such as an entire address including the zip code
would be protected, but a zip code alone would not.103
94 Trial Order, Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., No. 37-2008-00086061-CU-BT-
CTL, 2008 WL 7414542 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 2008); Pineda v. Williams-
Sonoma Stores, Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009), rev’d, 246 P.3d 612 (Cal.
2011).
95 Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 246 P.3d 612 (Cal. 2011).
96 Pineda, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 460.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(b) (2009).
100 Pineda, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 461.
101 Id. (quoting Party City Corp. v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 721, 738 (Ct. App.
2008)).
102 Pineda, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 461 (citing Party City, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 736).
103 Id. As the appellate court declared, the statute defined PII as data that were “spe-
cific in nature regarding an individual, rather than a group identifier such as a zip code.”
Id. (quoting Party City, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 738).
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The California Supreme Court reversed this verdict, but it did so
on the narrowest possible grounds. The Court analyzed the statutory
language and legislative history of the statute and found that both sup-
ported finding a legislative intent to include a zip code as part of the
“cardholder’s address.”104 In other words, that statutory category
included “not only a complete address, but also its components.”105
Yet, the California Supreme Court had only tweaked a subcategory
within the specific-types approach. It did not reach the broader con-
clusion that the Act’s specific categories reflected a policy to prevent
retailers from collecting identification indices that would permit a
definitive linkage between a customer and her address.
A more accurate reading of the law would be that it prohibits
merchants from collecting information that is specific enough to allow
the identification of a unique person. Under such a reading, a zip code
would be covered by the statute. Regardless of the fact that numerous
individuals may share the same zip code, this piece of information,
coupled with an individual’s name, enables retailers to link the indi-
vidual customer with a wealth of PII about her.106 As the state
supreme court itself observed, once the Williams-Sonoma store had
Pineda’s zip code, it drew on a licensed proprietary database to per-
form a “reverse search[ ]” that allowed it to identify the customer’s
address and other information about her.107 In fact, the store had cre-
ated this database to market products to its customers as well as to
have the possibility of selling “the information it ha[d] compiled to
other businesses.”108
As for COPPA, our third example of the specific-types approach,
this federal statute has an advantage that the Massachusetts and
California laws lack. COPPA explicitly references FTC rulemaking as
a way to expand and adapt its definition of PII.109 The FTC has indeed
acted to expand the definition of PII in the statute; its COPPA rule
added one element to the statutory concept of PII, namely, the idea of
“a persistent identifier,” such as a cookie.110 However, the FTC’s
ability to alter the definition of PII is limited by a requirement that
information covered by the statute must permit the “contacting of a
104 Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 246 P.3d at 616, 619–20 (quoting CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1747.08(b)).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 615.
107 Id. Such searches were run through “databases that contain millions of names, e-mail
addresses, residential telephone numbers and residential addresses . . . .” Pineda, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 460.
108 Pineda, 246 P.3d at 615.
109 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8)(F) (2006).
110 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2011).
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specific individual.”111 As we will discuss in more detail later, there
are indications that this agency is unlikely to define “contacting” to
include serving specific ads to a person.112
A final difficulty with COPPA, and one that is typical of rules, is
that it requires that PII be defined in advance.113 The COPPA twist is
to permit the statutory listing to be expanded through agency
rulemaking.114 Nonetheless, the risk remains that new technology will
develop too quickly for this approach to be effective. For example, the
FTC’s COPPA Rule has not been revisited since it was issued in 2000.
Indeed, the FTC’s own wavering line regarding new privacy legislation
serves as an illustration of internal gridlock in a regulatory agency.115
In his study of co-regulatory privacy approaches, Ira Rubinstein traces
a long cycle, from 1995 to 2010, in which “the FTC’s embrace of self-
regulatory solutions has waxed and waned over the years, and once
again appears to be ascendant at least as to online behavioral
advertising.”116
* * *
Despite the importance of the concept of PII to privacy law and
regulation, there remains a lack of consensus in the United States
about how to define it. All current legal models for this concept are
flawed. The tautological approach merely begs the question. The non-
public approach seeks to define what PII is not, but its focus on the
public or private nature of the data is ultimately a different issue than
whether or not data are identifiable to a person. Finally, the specific-
types approach fails to offer a definition—it merely lists examples of
PII, but supplies no concept or method by which to determine
whether a type of information belongs on or off the list.
As we have also seen, the PII issue only emerged in the late 1960s
with the widespread use of the computer. It was due to this device’s
ability to change the means of accessing and searching information
that the line between PII and non-PII became less certain. Today, that
line is not merely uncertain: Professor Ohm questions whether
111 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8)(F).
112 See infra Part IV.C.I (arguing that a cookie used only to send targeted ads would not
fall within the FTC’s definition of PII).
113 See 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8) (defining “personal information” and giving a representative
list of types of information that fall within that category).
114 Id. § 6501(8)(F).
115 See Ira Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Behind Voluntary
Codes (NYU Sch. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 10-16, 2011), http://www.
is-journal.org/hotworks/rubinstein.php (last visited Oct. 31, 2011) (describing shortcomings
in the FTC’s approach to monitoring online profiling).
116 Id.
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maintaining a distinction between PII and non-PII is even possible.117
Thus, privacy law and scholarship must confront the PII problem.
II
THE PROBLEMS WITH PII
PII remains a central concept in privacy regulation. It strikes
many as common sense that a person’s privacy can be harmed only
when PII is collected, used, or disclosed. In this Part, we explain why
PII, as currently defined, is a troubled concept for framing privacy
regulation. As we contend, the current distinction between PII and
non-PII proves difficult to maintain. Indeed, whether information is
identifiable to a person will depend upon context and cannot be deter-
mined a priori.
In this Section, we proceed through four steps to show defects in
the existing distinction between PII and non-PII. First, we discuss a
widely held misunderstanding about anonymity on the Internet. Many
people believe that if they do not formally use their name when oper-
ating in cyberspace that they are anonymous. Due to the growth of
static IP addresses, however, there is a basic level of built-in iden-
tifiability as soon as a computer connects to the Internet. Second, we
show how information that is initially non-PII can be transformed into
PII. Technology increasingly enables marketers and others to combine
various pieces of non-PII to produce PII, or otherwise to forge a link
between some data and a specific person. In fact, the permanent de-
identification of information is difficult because so much data about
individuals exists in so many places, and some of these data are linked
to specific identities. Third, technology itself is constantly changing.
As a result, the line between PII and non-PII is not fixed but depends
upon changing technological developments. Fourth, the ability to dis-
tinguish PII from non-PII frequently depends on context. For
example, whether or not a search query is PII cannot be determined in
the abstract.118
A. The Anonymity Myth and the IP Address
There is a common myth about anonymity on the Internet. Many
people likely believe that anonymity exists for most situations when
one surfs the Web or engages in behavior in cyberspace. The “ano-
nymity myth,” as we will call it, is the incorrect assumption that as
long as one does not explicitly do something under one’s actual name
117 See Ohm, supra note 6, at 1742 (positing that PII is an “ever-expanding category”
that “will never stop growing until it includes everything”).
118 See infra notes 142–45 and accompanying text.
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on the Internet, there will be safety from identification. In other
words, there is a false belief that the default for most Internet situa-
tions is anonymity. By extension, many believe that if one does not
provide specific identification when posting a comment to a blog or
social network website, or if one relies on a pseudonym, anonymity
has been secured for such behavior. Despite the fact that it appears so
easy to act anonymously online, this anonymity offers no more protec-
tion than a veil over one’s face that can readily be lifted.
At its most basic level, the anonymity myth stems from a mis-
taken conflation between momentary anonymity with actual
untraceability. It is easy to communicate online or surf the Web
without immediately revealing one’s identity, but it is much more dif-
ficult to be non-traceable. Whenever one is online, a potential for
traceability exists. In this section, we explore a threshold issue at the
entry to cyberspace that contributes significantly to traceability: the
internet protocol (IP) address. In later sections, we will discuss a
number of other factors that contribute to such traceability on the
Internet.
An IP address is a unique identifier that is assigned to every com-
puter connected to the Internet.119 Due to the shift from dial-up to
static IP addresses, Internet service providers (ISPs) now have logs
that link IP addresses with particular computers and, in many cases,
eventually to specific users.120 To understand why these links exist, it
will be useful to trace the shift in usage from dial-up Internet service
to broadband.
Like the Sony Walkman and cassette tapes, dial-up service is a
cultural relic of fading significance. Dial-up is a form of Internet
access that uses the facilities of the public-switched telephone network
to establish a connection to an ISP. According to a 2010 report from
the Pew Research Center, only five percent of Americans continue to
use dial up service to access the Internet.121 A pro-anonymity aspect
of dial up Internet service is its dynamic assignment of a new IP
address to a customer’s computer every time she connects to the
Internet.122 As a consequence, many customers share a single IP
address at different times over the course of a single day. Moreover,
ISPs typically do not retain records about dynamic IP use for long
119 GARY BAHADUR ET AL., PRIVACY DEFENDED 192 (2002).
120 Id. at 194.
121 AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIVE PROJECT, HOME BROADBAND 2010, at 6
(Aug. 11, 2010), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Home-Broadband-2010.aspx.
122 BAHADUR ET AL., supra note 119, at 194.
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periods of time.123 The result is that identification of any specific
person through an IP address is relatively unlikely.
Starting in the last decade, however, the majority of Internet
users began to access it through high-speed services, such as cable or
DSL.124 The benefit of such broadbrand access is that it enables a
wide range of activities in cyberspace, including multimedia and vir-
tual worlds. These experiences would be impossible at dial-up’s glacial
rate of Internet access. On the negative side, broadband connections
generally are based on static IP addresses, which do not change. That
is, a long-standing DSL or cable account will have the same IP address
for years.125 In the current age of broadband, where an IP address is
statically assigned to a particular computer, the overall capability for
identification of users is greatly enhanced. The threshold of cyber-
space is now marked in a new fashion.
The identification of a seemingly anonymous Internet user can
easily follow from an IP address. Connection to a website normally
reveals a user’s IP address to the host website, and look-up tools avail-
able on the Internet permit certain information to be revealed about
an IP address.126 Such details include the hostname and a map indi-
cating its general location.127 With such access to a user’s IP address, a
third party need only have the user’s ISP match the relevant account
information to the IP address assigned to that user’s computer in
order to personally identify the account holder.
To be sure, IP addresses do not directly identify a particular
person. Instead, an IP address is assigned to a specific computer or
internet device in order to allow it access to the Internet. Therefore,
identification does not follow automatically from access to an IP
address alone. For example, a computer may be used by multiple
members of a household. Not surprisingly then, some companies have
123 For this reason, the Electronic Frontier Foundation finds the concern about linking a
person to her searches lessened in cases where the ISP assigns dynamic IP addresses. Six
Tips To Protect Your Search Privacy, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 2006), https://
www.eff.org/wp/six-tips-protect-your-search-privacy.
124 John B. Horrigan, Home Broadband 2008, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 2
(Jul. 2, 2008), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2008/Home-Broadband-2008.aspx.
125 BAHADUR ET AL., supra note 119, at 194.
126 For a selection of these websites, see IP-LOOKUP, http://ip-lookup.net/ (last visited
Oct. 31, 2011); NETWORK-TOOLS.COM, http://network-tools.com/ (last visited Oct. 31,
2011); IP Lookup, WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM, http://whatismyipaddress.com/ip-lookup
(last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
127 For a website offering this information, see IP Lookup ,
WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM, http://whatismyipaddress.com/ip-lookup (last visited Oct. 31,
2011).
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argued that an IP address is non-PII.128 Yet this argument is
misleading.129 In the case of the IP address, various other clues can
readily be used to identify particular individuals. These clues include
analysis of the websites that a person visited during a particular ses-
sion of web surfing. For example, a family member may check her
work webmail and use a unique password to do so. In this fashion, it
will be possible to distinguish one member of the family from another.
IP addresses can also be readily linked to individuals who post
information online. In one notable example, an anonymous person
wrote defamatory information in a Wikipedia entry for John
Seigenthaler, who had been an assistant to Attorney General Bobby
Kennedy during the Kennedy Administration. The anonymous person
wrote that Seigenthaler “was thought to have been directly involved
in the Kennedy assassinations of both John, and his brother, Bobby.
Nothing was ever proven.”130 The incident gathered national attention
when Seigenthaler wrote an editorial in USA Today condemning the
defamation.131
As it turned out, Wikipedia had kept a record of the IP address
listed for the person who posted the contested information in the
Seigenthaler biography.132 A third party who read about the incident
was able to obtain the IP address from Wikipedia and use IP lookup
software to trace it to the address of a delivery company in Nashville.
A New York Times reporter then called the company, and this addi-
tional publicity, as well as the likelihood of an internal company inves-
tigation, prompted the person who wrote about Seigenthaler to
confess, apologize, and resign from his job.133
While Seigenthaler did not wish to file a lawsuit against the ISP to
unmask the identity of the user in question, so-called “John Doe”
128 For examples of companies successfully making this argument in litigation, see
Klimas v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, Inc., 465 F.3d 271, 276 n.2 (6th Cir. 2006); Johnson v.
Microsoft Corp., No. C06-0900RAJ, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58174, at *13 (W.D. Wash.
June 23, 2009); Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093 FMCJCX, 2007 WL
2080419, at *3 n.10 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007).
129 Cf. Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 458, 461 (discussing the
potential for zip codes to be PII).
130 John Seigenthaler, A False Wikipedia “Biography,” USA TODAY, Nov. 30, 2005, at
A11.
131 Katharine Q. Seelye, A Little Sleuthing Unmasks Writer of Wikipedia Prank, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, at 1.51.
132 Seigenthaler, supra note 130, at A11. BellSouth, the ISP for the account, refused to
reveal the account information of the account holder without a court order, and
Seigenthaler declined to file a so-called “John Doe” lawsuit to unmask the identity of that
person. Id.
133 Seelye, supra note 131.
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cases are now common.134 Although case law is far from settled, ISPs
generally require that an entity seeking account information for an IP
address provide them with a subpoena.135 The standard for obtaining
such subpoenas is relatively lenient—courts require the party seeking
the data to show that the identity is needed as a key element in a case,
and that this identity information is not otherwise available to the
party seeking it.136 The Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) has recently made active use of John Doe actions to unmask
individuals who are engaged in file-sharing of copyrighted works.137
Revealing IP address information has made legal actions possible
against tens of thousands of patrons of sites such as BitTorrent.138
Finally, IP addresses can lead to identification of a person even
without account information from an ISP. Three computer scientists
have demonstrated a way to identify a person based on a “trail of
seemingly anonymous and homogenous data left across different loca-
tions.”139 Their paper provides the example of “an online consumer
[who] visits websites, leaving the IP address of his computer logged at
each site visited.”140 This consumer can be identified without a John
Doe lawsuit because at other sites “he may also provide explicitly
identifying information; for example, his name and address are pro-
vided to complete a purchase.”141 As the authors explain, “[b]y exam-
ining the trails of which IP addresses appeared at which locations in
the de-identified data and matching those visit patterns to which cus-
tomers appeared in the identified customer lists, IP addresses can be
related to names and addresses.”142
134 For a discussion of John Doe suits, see Patrick Fogarty, Major Record Labels and the
RIAA, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 140, 156–58 (2009) (explaining how John Doe suits, which
are usually granted ex parte, permit the RIAA to discover the identities of ISP customers)
and Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1, 16–17
(2006) (describing how identified John Doe defendants usually settle outside of court and
for “relatively small monetary settlement[s]”).
135 Cohen, supra note 134, at 16–17.
136 Fogarty, supra note 134, at 156–57.
137 Paul Roberts, RIAA Sues 532 ‘John Does,’ PCWORLD (Jan. 21, 2004), available at
http://www.pcworld.com/article/114387/riaa_sues_532_john_does.html.
138 Casey J. Dickinson, Movie Industry Seeks Cornell Pirate, 19 BUS. J. CENT. N.Y., Dec.
9, 2005, at 1. As Cohen notes: “Most defendants quickly settle for an amount reported to
be in the $3000–$6000 range. Because these lawsuits typically have low filing and overhead
costs, the civil settlement program has become a profit center for the industry.” Cohen,
supra note 134, at 17.
139 Bradley Malin, Latanya Sweeney & Elaine Newton, Trail Re-identification 1
(Carnegie Mellon Univ., Sch. of Computer Sci., Data Privacy Lab., Tech. Report No.
LIDAP-WP12), available at  http://dataprivacylab.org/dataprivacy/projects/trails/
index3.html.
140 Id. at 2.
141 Id.
142 Id.
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Like the Wikipedia user who wrote about Seigenthaler, people
may be surprised when linked to something they presumed that they
had said or done anonymously. They may be dismayed when a notice
of a lawsuit arrives from the RIAA after they visit BitTorrent anony-
mously. They may be amazed that even scattered visits to websites can
enable their identity to be linked to their IP address. These initial
examples, all centered around IP addresses, demonstrate only some of
the ways in which online anonymity is often a mirage. In today’s infor-
mation age, it is increasingly difficult for data to remain unidentified.
We now explore additional dimensions of this problem.
B. The Re-Identification of Data: Goodbye Non-PII?
Technology is now posing a considerable challenge to the non-PII
side of the dichotomy. Computer scientists are finding ever more
inventive ways to combine various pieces of non-PII to make them
PII. This trend shows up, for example, in some remarkable demon-
strations of how supposedly de-identified information can be re-
personalized. America Online’s (AOL) release of search queries and
research by Latanya Sweeney both illustrate this point.
In 2006, AOL released twenty million search queries for the ben-
efit of researchers.143 These queries were considered to be fully
anonymized. Yet, reporters from the New York Times quickly demon-
strated that at least some of this information could easily be re-
personalized. The reporters showed how they were able to identify
one person based on her search queries—User No. 4417749.144
According to the article:
[S]earch by search, click by click, the identity of AOL user No.
4417749 became easier to discern. There are queries for “land-
scapers in Lilburn, Ga,” several people with the last name Arnold
and “homes sold in shadow lake subdivision gwinnett county
georgia.”
It did not take much investigating to follow that data trail to Thelma
Arnold, a 62-year old widow who lives in Lilburn, Ga., frequently
researches her friends’ medical ailments and loves her three dogs.
“Those are my searches,” she said, after a reporter read part of the
list to her.145
143 Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No.
4417749, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A1.
144 Id.
145 Id.
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AOL ultimately apologized for the disclosure. It recognized that it had
violated the privacy of its users despite its attempts to anonymize the
data.146
The privacy debacle at AOL demonstrates a major problem with
defining some types of information as non-PII: Technology
increasingly enables the combination of various pieces of non-PII to
produce PII. According to a study done by computer science professor
Latanya Sweeney, the combination of a ZIP code, birth date, and
gender will be sufficient to identify 87% of individuals in the United
States.147 These pieces of data are all generally considered to be non-
PII. Moreover, they are not intimate, embarrassing, or particularly
sensitive. Nevertheless, combining them will identify the vast majority
of Americans. According to Sweeney, “for much of the adult popula-
tion in the United States, local census information can be used to re-
identify de-identified data since other personal characteristics, such as
gender, date of birth, and ZIP code, often combine uniquely to iden-
tify individuals.”148 As a further example, during the 1960s, the United
States government began to sell census data to marketers that con-
sisted only of addresses without names.149 Marketing companies, how-
ever, were able to link names to these addresses by drawing on data in
telephone books and voter registration lists.150
A further problem with non-PII is the wide availability of so
much information about people. This phenomenon of data availability
heightens the ability to turn non-PII into PII. This aspect of the re-
personalization problem stems from a privacy problem that we will
call “aggregation.”151 Aggregation involves the combination of
various pieces of data.
We have already seen an example of this phenomenon involving
IP addresses and the identification of individuals, even without a John
Doe lawsuit. Visitation patterns can permit the use of an IP address to
146 Anick Jesdanun, AOL: Breach of Privacy Was a Mistake, WASH. POST (Aug. 7,
2006), http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/07/AR2006080700790.
html.
147 Latanya Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely 1 (Carnegie
Mellon Univ., Sch. of Computer Sci., Data Privacy Lab., Working Paper No. 3, 2000).
148 Latanya Sweeney, Maintaining Patient Confidentiality When Sharing Medical Data
Requires a Symbiotic Relationship Between Technology and Policy 5 (Artificial Intelligence
Lab., Mass. Inst. of Tech., Working Paper No. AIWP-WP344, 1997), available at http://
privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/law/aiwp.pdf.
149 ERIK LARSON, THE NAKED CONSUMER: HOW OUR PRIVATE LIVES BECOME PUBLIC
COMMODITIES 41, 52 (1992).
150 Id. at 218–19.
151 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 117–21 (2008) (explaining the
mechanics of aggregation).
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link de-identified data to names and addresses.152 Additionally, a
person who thinks she is anonymous while using certain sites may pro-
vide explicitly identifying information, as when completing a
purchase.153 A further example involves a study of Netflix movie
rentals by two computer scientists, Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly
Shmatikov. The Narayanan-Shmatikov research demonstrated that at
least some people in a supposedly anonymous data set could be
identified based on how they rated movies on a publicly available
website.154 This example is worth exploring in some detail.
Netflix is a popular online movie rental service, which made a
supposedly de-identified database of ratings publicly available as part
of a contest to improve the predictive capabilities of its movie recom-
mending software. Narayanan and Shmatikov found a way to link this
data with the movie ratings that participating individuals gave to films
in the Internet Movie Database (IMDb), a popular website with infor-
mation and ratings about movies.155 They concluded: “Given a user’s
public IMDb ratings, which the user posted voluntarily to selectively
reveal some of his . . . movie likes and dislikes, we discover all the
ratings that he entered privately into the Netflix system, presumably
expecting that they will remain private.”156 As this study demon-
strates, a single piece of non-PII does not exist alone. Rather, such
data form only part of a shifting landscape in which extensive informa-
tion is available about almost every individual. This rich tableau of
available information poses significant concerns for information
privacy.
The more information about a person that is known, the more
likely it becomes that this information can be used to identify that
person or to determine further data about her. When aggregated,
information has a way of producing more information, such that de-
identification of data becomes more difficult. Thus, it becomes pos-
sible to look for overlap in the data and then to link up different
bodies of data.
152 Malin, Sweeney & Newton, supra note 139, at 2.
153 Id.
154 Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-Anonymization of Large Sparse
Datasets (2008 IEEE Symp. on Sec. and Privacy 111, Feb. 5, 2008), available at http://www.
cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_oak08netflix.pdf.
155 INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
156 Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 154, at 16. The authors concede that the results
did not “imply anything about the percentage of IMDb users who can be identified in the
Netflix Prize dataset.” Id. For an insightful technical analysis of the limits of the Netflix
study and how it is has been misunderstood, see Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data
Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH., manuscript at 25–26 (forthcoming Dec. 2011–Jan.
2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\86-6\NYU603.txt unknown Seq: 31 28-NOV-11 15:01
1844 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:1814
This discussion is far from hypothetical—data miners and mar-
keters currently draw on these techniques. For example, suppose the
following anonymous record exists about an individual:
Name: Unique alpha-numerical identifier
Age: 13
Favorite Toy: Legos
Favorite Movie: Batman
Favorite Candy: Snickers
Favorite Restaurant: McDonald’s
Zip Code: 20052
In a world without other sources of data, this information would
likely remain anonymous. But in today’s world, there are countless
other data sources. This seemingly anonymous child might have a pro-
file at a social network website, such as Facebook:
Name: Billy Doe
Age: 13
Location: I live in Washington, DC
Narrative: I love to build things with Legos. I love Snickers bars. I
recently saw the Batman movie and thought it was the coolest movie
ever!
Another database might have the following information:
Name: William Doe
Date of Birth: 04-04-1996
Address: 2000 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20052
Piecing together these pieces of information, one can link the
anonymized record to William Doe.
In Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. Ashcroft, Judge Richard
Posner aptly recognized that de-identified data can readily be re-
identified.157 The government had subpoenaed patient records of
women who had undergone partial birth abortions. The records were
to be redacted so that the identities of the women would not be dis-
closed.158 Despite the redaction, the court quashed the subpoena, con-
cluding that de-identified patient records still violated the patients’
right to privacy.159 As Judge Posner reasoned:
Some of these women will be afraid that when their redacted
records are made a part of the trial record in New York, persons of
their acquaintance, or skillful “Googlers,” sifting the information
contained in the medical records concerning each patient’s medical
157 362 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2004).
158 Id. at 925.
159 Id. at 932–33.
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and sex history, will put two and two together, “out” the 45 women,
and thereby expose them to threats, humiliation, and obloquy.160
Through his concept of “skillful ‘Googlers,’” Judge Posner identified
only one of the many powerful tools that now exist for retrieving de-
identified information, analyzing it, and linking it to other information
in order to re-personalize it.161
Research by computer scientists indicates the legitimacy of
Posner’s concern about the unmasking of information that is consid-
ered non-PII. For example, Professor Sweeney notes that in many
health care data sets, there will be unique data about people that can
be used to identify them even when they are not explicitly identified
in the data set. As she proposes, medical data stripped of identifying
information such as names, addresses, phone numbers, and social
security numbers, is not really anonymized because “the remaining
data can be used to re-identify individuals by linking or matching the
data to other databases or by looking at unique characteristics found
in the fields and records of the database itself.”162 Further, she
observes that in medical facilities, “[n]urses, clerks and other hospital
personnel will often remember unusual cases and in interviews may
provide additional details that help identify [a] patient.”163 In another
study, Sweeney and co-author Bradley Malin demonstrate that
“genomic data can often be re-identified in a distributed health envi-
ronment.”164 Finally, as we have already noted, Ohm has brought the
complexities of anonymization to the attention of the legal
academy.165
C. The Problem of Changing Technology and
Information-Sharing Practices
The technical difficulties of de-identifying data raise a challenge
to current concepts of PII. Yet, as we have demonstrated in Part I, it is
precisely this idea that serves a gatekeeping function at present in
information privacy law. A further challenge to current concepts of
PII is that technology is constantly changing. As early as 1977, the
Privacy Protection Study Commission observed that “[a] major
problem created by the widespread adoption of computer and tele-
160 Id. at 929.
161 For an example of an earlier court that recognized these same issues, see Parkson v.
Cent. DuPage Hosp., 435 N.E.2d 140, 144 (Ill. App. 1982).
162 Sweeney, supra note 148, at 6.
163 Id. at 1.
164 Bradley Malin & Latanya Sweeney, How (not) To Protect Genomic Data Privacy in
a Distributed Network: Using Trail Re-identification To Evaluate and Design Privacy
Protection Systems, 37 J. BIOMED. INFORMATICS 179, 191 (2004).
165 Ohm, supra note 6, at 1716–31.
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communications technology to personal-data record keeping is the
inability to anticipate and control future use of information.”166 The
Commission noted that systems were developed and then modified
with an eye only to immediate and specific needs. There was a lack of
consideration of the long-term implications of the computerization of
other areas of record-keeping, and such developments were, at any
rate, difficult to predict.167
The same problem exists for the distinction between PII and non-
PII. The line between PII and non-PII is not fixed, but depends upon
technology. Thus, today’s non-PII might be tomorrow’s PII. New and
surprising discoveries are constantly being made about ways of com-
bining data to reveal other data. For example, a recent study by
Alessandro Acquisti and Ralph Gross demonstrates that people’s
social security numbers can be predicted based on other pieces of data
such as birth date and birth location.168 As they state, “ it is possible to
predict, entirely from public data, narrow ranges of values wherein
individual social security numbers are likely to fall.”169 The implica-
tions of this study are dramatic, as Acquisti and Gross state, “Unless
mitigating strategies are implemented, the predictability of social
security numbers exposes them to risks of identity theft on mass
scales.”170
In addition to new technological abilities that permit the re-
identification of data, another important factor that facilitates re-
identification of data is the proliferation of personal information
online and in offline record systems. In particular, corporate practices
now play an important role in shaping the amount and kinds of infor-
mation that are available online. To illustrate, we can consider the
Facebook Beacon system and Google Buzz.
In 2007, Facebook introduced the Beacon online ad system,
which tracked users’ online activities on third-party websites. Without
initial warning to Facebook users, this ad system shared collected
information from the third-party sites not only with Facebook, but
with a user’s Facebook friends.171 Thus, activities such as purchasing a
product, signing up for a new service, or placing an item on a wish list
would lead to personal information flowing to one’s friends and to
166 PRIVACY COMM’N, TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY, supra note 21, at 26.
167 Id.
168 Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Predicting Social Security Numbers from Public
Data, 106 PNAS 10975 (2009).
169 Id. at 10975.
170 Id.
171 Caroline McCarthy, Facebook’s Zuckerburg: “We Simply Did a Bad Job” Handling
Beacon , CNET (Dec. 5, 2007, 11:41 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_
3-9829526-36.html.
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Facebook.172 As a further example, in 2010 Google introduced Buzz,
its own social networking platform in a fashion that also led to a wide-
spread proliferation of users’ personal information. Buzz permits
users to share updates, comments, photographs, videos, and other
information through posts, which are called “buzzes.”173 However, as
the FTC noted in its complaint against Google, “Without prior notice
or the opportunity to consent, Gmail users were, in many instances,
automatically set up with ‘followers’ (people following the user). In
addition, after enrolling in Buzz, Gmail users were automatically set
up to ‘follow’ other users.”174
In sum, whether information can be re-identified depends on
technology and corporate practices that permit the linking of de-
identified data with already-identified data.175 Moreover, as additional
pieces of identified data become available, it becomes easier to link
them to de-identified data because there are likely to be more data
elements in common.
D. The Ability To Identify Depends on Context
In many cases, a determination of whether some data are PII as
opposed to non-PII is complex because information does not readily
fit into one of these two categories. As noted above, identifiability is a
complex concept because of the changing landscape of technology, as
well as social and corporate practices. Abstract determinations of
whether a given piece of information is PII are insufficient because
the ability to identify information is driven by context.
Consider Internet search queries that are anonymized. A search
query is the information that a person types into a search engine like
Google.176 In the abstract, if anonymized, search queries appear to be
non-PII. Recall, though, that AOL mistakenly believed such informa-
tion was anonymous when it released its search-query data.177 Yet it is
172 Id. The social networking site also structured the Beacon system such that these data
were initially transmitted without a user being able to opt out of the program. Id. In 2010, a
federal judge approved a $9.5 million settlement of a class action lawsuit concerning this
matter. Settlement Agreement Exhibit 2 at 2, Lane v. Facebook Inc., No. 5:08-cv-03845-RS
(N.D. Cal., Aug. 12, 2008).
173 Complaint ¶ 7, In re Google Inc., File No. 102-3136, 2011 WL 1321658 (F.T.C. Mar.
30, 2011).
174 Id. The program automatically shared user information even if a Gmail user selected
the “Nah, go to my inbox” choice from the initial Buzz screen. Id. ¶ 8.
175 See FTC, PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 37–38 (highlighting examples of
AOL’s and Netflix’s data collection practices to demonstrate the potential identifiability of
de-identified data).
176 For a general discussion of privacy at Google and some of the international implica-
tions of its privacy policies, see JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH 189–210 (2005).
177 See supra notes 143–46 and accompanying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\86-6\NYU603.txt unknown Seq: 35 28-NOV-11 15:01
1848 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:1814
not possible to make an abstract judgment of whether or not a search
query can become PII. It depends upon the nature of the search in
which the subject person had been engaged. If the only data is a single
search query for something general (such as a search for “poodles”)
then identifying a specific user might be difficult. But if the user has
engaged in a highly specific search, or multiple searches, she becomes
more identifiable. At some point, a search allows a person to be
readily identifiable.
In Gonzales v. Google, the government had sought to obtain
from Google a sample of user search queries.178 The district court
quashed the subpoena on privacy grounds and reasoned that
[a]lthough the Government has only requested the text strings
entered . . . basic identifiable information may be found in the text
strings when users search for personal information such as their
social security numbers or credit card numbers. . . . The Court is
also aware of so-called “vanity searches,” where a user queries his
or her own name perhaps with other information.179
The court’s example of the “vanity search” is an excellent one. A
search for one’s own name combined with just a few other searches
will readily allow the de-masking of the data subject.
Thus, the question of whether search queries are PII cannot be
answered in the abstract. Trying to classify search queries as PII or
non-PII in order to fit them into the binary system of much current
privacy regulation is futile. The consequences of search queries will
depend upon the context, such as the specific things searched for, as
well as what other information is already available about a user.
Nonetheless, the distinction between PII and non-PII is almost always
made in the abstract in privacy regulation. As Part IV demonstrates,
our concept of PII 2.0 responds to this situation by requiring context-
based evaluations around a standard-based definition of PII.
III
BEHAVIORAL MARKETING AND THE SURPRISING
IRRELEVANCE OF PII
The problems with the current approach to PII are most dramati-
cally illustrated by looking at the burgeoning practice of behavioral
marketing. This practice—sometimes referred to as targeted mar-
keting—involves examining the behavioral patterns of consumers in
order to target advertisements to them based on their presumed pref-
erences. Public interest groups, scholars, and government regulatory
178 234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
179 Id. at 687.
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agencies such as the FTC have examined this practice and raised
objections to it on privacy grounds.180 As we demonstrate in this Part,
behavioral marketing is conducted in ways that challenge traditional
conceptions of PII. In particular, we explore behavioral marketing in
the context of selling food products to children, an issue with
profound implications because of the growing health crisis of obesity
among minors.
A. From Mass Marketing to Behavioral Marketing
In the past, companies engaged in mass marketing. They targeted
their audience using the general demographical information regarding
those watching particular TV shows or reading particular periodicals.
Today, companies instead direct offerings to a specific individual
based on information collected about the particular characteristics,
preferences, and behavior of this person. The holy grail of modern
advertising is “one-to-one” marketing.181 The result of such marketing
is to create “advertising crafted to uniquely engage” each indi-
vidual.182 This technique is called behavioral marketing; the idea is for
advertisers to record a person’s behavior, analyze it, and shape the
kinds of offers directed to that party based on the patterns that
emerge from this collected data.
The key recent development has been, moreover, the ability of
companies to engage in behavioral marketing without using PII—at
least as this term is traditionally understood. In this section, we trace
the transformation from the epoch of mass marketing to the contem-
180 For the views of an NGO, see the insightful reports by Jeff Chester and Kathryn
Montgomery under the sponsorship of the Berkeley Media Studies Group (BMSG). These
include JEFF CHESTER ET AL., ALCOHOL MARKETING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2–12 (2010)
(noting alcohol brands’ use of digital marketing, including “interactive virtual universe[s]”
and behavioral marketing, to advertise to youth); JEFF CHESTER & KATHRYN
MONTGOMERY, INTERACTIVE FOOD & BEVERAGE MARKETING: TARGETING CHILDREN
AND YOUTH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 31–36 (2007) [hereinafter CHESTER & MONTGOMERY,
INTERACTIVE MARKETING] (discussing “behavioral profiling” as one of the ways that food
and beverage advertisers reach children in “the new digital marketing landscape”).
The FTC reported on behavioral marketing in depth in 2009. See FED. TRADE
COMM’N, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING (2009)
[hereinafter FTC, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES]. For an example of international atten-
tion to the topic, see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 2/2010 on Online
Behavioural Advertising, 00909/10/EN/WP 171 (June 22, 2010).
181 See DON PEPPERS & MARTHA ROGERS, ENTERPRISE ONE TO ONE 30–78 (1997)
(providing background on one-to-one marketing and noting that targeting customers indi-
vidually can vastly improve marketing results); DON PEPPERS & MARTHA ROGERS, THE
ONE TO ONE FUTURE 138–72 (1993) (indicating that firms that engage in one-to-one mar-
keting will be more successful than those that engage in mass marketing).
182 JEFF CHESTER & KATHRYN MONTGOMERY, INTERACTIVE FOOD & BEVERAGE
MARKETING: AN UPDATE 2 (2008).
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porary age of one-to-one marketing. We then explore modern infor-
mation exchanges, and the way in which companies increasingly
structure this process to be free of the collection of PII as it is defined
in law.
1. Modern One-to-One Marketing
The age of merchandizing on a mass scale began in the 1850s with
department stores displaying goods that were marked with uniform
prices for all to see.183 Such mass marketing was a global phenom-
enon—for example, E´mile Zola devoted a brilliant novel, Au Bonheur
des Dames, to the events in a department store, a new kind of indus-
trial organization that fascinated him.184 Throughout the Western
world, the mass-merchandizing approach proved stable for over a cen-
tury. In Joseph Turow’s words, the result was “a fairly egalitarian and
transparent marketplace, with products and prices that all could
see.”185 Along with mass merchandising came mass marketing, as
advertisers and other “hidden persuaders” during this period
exploited broad patterns drawn from demographic data to effectively
target groups of consumers.186
In contrast, contemporary behavioral marketing targets individ-
uals—by drawing on digital information about their past behavior, as
well as on knowledge about how other parties similarly situated have
behaved. Already in 1971, Arthur Miller warned that computerization
would permit “simulation activities involving the prediction of an indi-
vidual’s or a group’s behavior.”187 Miller was worried about the possi-
bility of future “attempts at human manipulation” by organizations
using computers to affect and shape their customers’ behavior.188
Digital technology and the Internet have now made Miller’s predic-
tion a daily occurrence; the goal of modern marketing is for a targeted
tracking of individuals to customize products, services, and prices.
In the twenty-first century, targeted marketing now occurs both
online and offline in highly sophisticated and potent ways. As Jeffrey
183 JOSEPH TUROW, NICHE ENVY: MARKET DISCRIMINATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE
23–24 (2006).
184 E´MILE ZOLA, AU BONHEUR DES DAMES (Robin Buss ed. & trans., Penguin Group
2001) (1883).
185 TUROW, supra note 183, at 180. In this same vein, Turow also writes of a “democrati-
zation of shopping.” Id. at 179.
186 For a popular account of how advertisers enlisted the aid of social scientists in the
1950s, see VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957). As Packard described,
advertisers and other “symbol manipulators” were “sitting at the feet of psychiatrists and
social scientists (particularly psychologists and sociologists) who ha[d] been hiring them-
selves out as ‘practical’consultants or setting up their own research firms.” Id. at 7.
187 MILLER, supra note 20, at 42.
188 Id. at 42–43.
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Chester warned in 2007, “[a]dvertisers are developing increasingly
sophisticated technologies designed to track, analyze, and persuade us
in the Internet era.”189 Marketers draw on extensive databases, which
sometimes combine people’s online and offline behavior. They are
able to cross-reference online activity with offline records including
home ownership, family income, marital status, zip code, and a host of
other information, such as one’s recent purchases as well as favorite
restaurants, movies, and TV shows.190
Individuals can now be tracked across different websites or digital
media. Moreover, online advertising networks follow people around
the web.191 In this new paradigm, an advertising network first places a
tracking file on a user’s computer, which allows the company to gather
information about a person’s behavior and preferences as she surfs
the Internet.192 In this tracking process, the advertising industry relies
on diverse technology to conduct such tracking, including basic
“cookies,” “flash cookies,” and “beacons.”193 Some technology, par-
ticularly the beacon, or “Web bug,” permits real-time observation of a
user’s activity on an Internet page, including where one’s mouse
moved and the information that one typed, such as search queries or
personal information that an individual filled into a form.194 The cut-
ting edge of this technology continues to advance, with some ISPs
starting to monitor the content of their customers’ internet activity
through a practice known as deep-packet inspection.195
Marketers today engage in a pinpoint process that focuses on
ever smaller groups of people.196 Instead of companies selling ads for
specific websites, advertisers now seek to buy access to individuals
189 JEFF CHESTER, DIGITAL DESTINY 128 (2007).
190 Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, On the Web’s Cutting Edge, Anonymity in Name Only,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2010, at A1; see also Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your
Secrets, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2010, at W1 (noting that marketers have access to a con-
sumer’s favorite movies, television shows, and news preferences); Jessica E. Vascellaro,
Google Agonizes on Privacy as Ad World Vaults Ahead, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2010, at A1
(describing Google’s access to a “vast trove of data,” including one user’s recent purchase
of a TV).
191 Vascellaro, supra note 190.
192 Angwin, supra note 190.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 See Deep Packet Inspection and Privacy, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION
CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/dpi (last visited Oct. 31, 2011) (describing deep-packet
inspection as involving inspection of the contents of data transmitted across the Internet at
the “packet” level, that is, through examination of the individual packages of bytes in
which all information is sent over the Internet thereby allowing the determination of all
contents of unencrypted data).
196 TUROW, supra note 183, at 1–3, 8.
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who fit a certain profile.197 Information collected about consumers is
packaged into profiles, which are sold on new kinds of “stock-market-
like exchanges.”198 The company that buys the underlying information
can then use it to serve targeted ads. As an investigatory series in the
Wall Street Journal states, “[i]nformation about people’s moment-to-
moment thoughts and actions, as revealed by their online activity, can
change hands quickly. Within seconds of visiting eBay.com or Expedia
.com, information detailing a Web surfer’s activity there is likely to be
auctioned on [a] data exchange.”199 Information about an individual’s
browsing habits sells for as little as a tenth of a cent online.200 All
those slivers of a cent nonetheless add up—marketing online is a bil-
lion dollar industry and remains a growth field.201
Behavioral marketing also depends on so-called analytics to
decide how to approach customers.202 Analytics provide a way for
organizations to draw on the great quantities of information in their
control or available from third parties and to use the data to make
better decisions and to create new products and services.203 In the def-
inition of Thomas Davenport and Jeanne Harris, two leading authori-
ties on this technology, “analytics” refers to “the extensive use of data,
statistical and quantitative analysis, explanatory and predictive
models, and fact-based management to drive decisions and
actions.”204 The idea is to take the information that entities have or to
which they can gain access, and to convert it to actionable knowl-
edge.205 This approach is now popular in the corporate world—as a
blogger on the website of the Harvard Business Review concisely
observed in September 2010, “[a]nalytics are now king.”206
197 Id. at 8.
198 Angwin, supra note 190.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 According to one estimate, online advertising is a $23 billion a year industry.
INTERACTIVE ADVER. BUREAU, INTERNET ADVERTISING REVENUE REPORT 3 (2009),
available at http://www.iab.net/media/file/IAB_PwC_2008_full_year.pdf.
202 THOMAS H. DAVENPORT & JEANNE G. HARRIS, COMPETING ON ANALYTICS 86–91
(2007).
203 Thomas H. Davenport, Competing on Analytics, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 2006, at 98,
101, 104, 106–07.
204 DAVENPORT & HARRIS, supra note 202, at 7.
205 As Thomas Davenport and co-authors explain, “[t]he analytic process makes knowl-
edge from data.” Thomas H. Davenport et al., Data to Knowledge to Results, CAL. MGT.
REV., Winter 2001, at 117, 128. Corporations in the information age are drowning in data,
but without drawing on the right technology, strategies, and “analytic resources,” the data
will not be turned into the “sort of knowledge that can inform business decisions and
create positive results.” Id. at 117–22.
206 Michael Fertig, Hire Great Guessers, HARV. BUS. REV. BLOG NETWORK (Sept. 2,
2010, 8:30 AM), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2010/09/hire_great_guessers.html.
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Behavioral marketing has also been controversial. Much of the
reaction, quite understandably, has been at a visceral level. For
example, newspapers have talked of “creepy” and secret practices.207
At the same time, and as a general matter when directed toward
adults, advertising is an accepted and inescapable part of life, and on
occasion, Americans even look forward to it.
There are two core objections to behavioral advertising when
directed toward adults. The first has to do with transparency and the
second with money. As for transparency, behavioral marketing takes
place today in a multi-channel process about which individuals gener-
ally receive scant information about the data that organizations collect
about them or how that information is used to shape interactions with
them. As the Wall Street Journal observes, “the tracking of consumers
has grown both far more pervasive and far more intrusive than is real-
ized by all but a handful of people in the vanguard of the industry.”208
This new kind of tracking largely takes place in the shadows, and
Americans, not surprisingly, have responded with deep unease.209 The
instinct of many people is to view these practices, at least in absence
of knowledge as to how they take place, as deceptive, otherwise
unfair, or even as a force capable of chilling their free behavior.210
Moreover, the very complexity of the marketing ecosystem heightens
the general ignorance of these corporate techniques, and reduces the
value of the tools that some companies are making available to
users.211
207 E.g. Jeff Gelles, When ‘Behavioral Marketing’ Turns Creepy, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER: INQUIRING CONSUMER (Feb. 21, 2011, 2:52 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/
business/When_behavioral_marketing_turns_creepy.html; see also Julia Angwin & Emily
Steel, Web’s Hot New Commodity: Privacy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2011, at A1 (indicating
that individuals find targeted ads to be “spooky”).
208 Angwin, supra note 190.
209 See JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., AMERICANS REJECT TAILORED ADVERTISING 3 (2009)
(“[M]ost Americans (66%) do not want marketers to tailor advertisements to their inter-
ests.”); Lymari Morales, U.S. Internet Users Ready To Limit Online Tracking for Ads,
GALLUP (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/145337/Internet-Users-Ready-Limit-
Online-Tracking-Ads.aspx (“Internet users are overwhelmingly negative about whether it
is OK for advertisers to use their online browsing history to target ads to them . . . .”).
210 See, e.g., Angwin & Steel, supra note 207 (quoting former brand marketer who sug-
gested that “[p]eople feel targeted online ads are ‘spooky’”); Nicholas Carr, Tracking is an
Assault on Liberty, With Real Dangers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2010, at W1
(“Personalization’s evil twin is manipulation.”).
211 Some organizations offer users individual controls, such as the ability to opt out from
some tracking and to set preferences about the kinds of information that are collected.
Google, Microsoft, and Mozilla are among the companies offering such privacy tools.
Byron Acohido, Google Chrome Will Join Other Browsers with Privacy Tools, U.S.A.
TODAY (Jan. 26, 2011, 10:58 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/
2011-01-26-privacy26_ST_N.htm.
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Regarding money, as we have noted, marketing online is a
billion-dollar growth industry. Even more specifically, targeted adver-
tisements command a considerable premium in the marketplace.212 As
the FTC noted in December 2010, the more that is known about
someone, the more that advertisers will pay to send her an advertise-
ment.213 Here, the question is how different parties should share in
the wealth that the trade in personal information creates. Ideally, a
market economy would permit the free price mechanism to set a price
for the data.214 Put less abstractly, Money magazine once summed up
the matter in these terms: “It’s your data, after all; these guys just
figured out how to sell it.”215 Yet the lack of transparency regarding
practices of data collection and tracking creates an asymmetry of
knowledge about existing information collection practices between
consumers and the organizations that collect information about them.
This information assymetry places consumers at a profound disadvan-
tage in negotiations, such as they may exist, with those who collect
their information.216 In sum, consumer objections to behavioral adver-
tising are real and deserve a policy response. At the same time, and as
the next section discusses, these tracking technologies do not rely on
PII as the law generally defines it today. This twist complicates the
matter of the appropriate policy response.
2. Marketing, Legal Enforcement, and the Question of Adults’ PII
In behavioral marketing, companies generally do not track indi-
viduals by name. Instead, they use software to build personal profiles
that exclude this item but that contain a wealth of details about each
individual.217 In lieu of a name, these personal profiles are associated
with a single alphanumerical code that is placed on an individual’s
computer to track their activity. In one reported case, for example, the
212 It is also possible to combine information that is collected offline with information
collected online and use the data to tailor advertisements to specific individuals. CHESTER
& MONTGOMERY, INTERACTIVE MARKETING, supra note 180, at 33–34. A firm distinction
between online and offline marketing no longer exists. Instead, the relevant category is
“digital marketing,” which occurs through multiple channels and different platforms. Id. at
3.
213 FTC, PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 37.
214 See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2055, 2069–76 (2004) (describing a model for propertization of personal data and pro-
posing solutions to combat the alleged market failure in the trade of personal information).
215 Pat Regnier, The ID Theft Protection Racket, MONEY, Sept. 2005, at 112, 116.
216 See Schwartz, supra note 214, at 2078–81 (“Consumer ignorance leads to a data
market in which one set of parties does not even know that ‘negotiating’ is taking place.”).
217 Angwin, supra note 190.
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tracking file consisted of this string: “4c812db292272995e5416a323e79
bd37.”218
These codes are used to decide which advertisements people see,
as well as the kinds of products that are offered to them. For example,
Capital One Financial Corporation relies on [x+1], an advertising net-
work, to decide instantaneously the specific type of credit card to
show first-time visitors to its website.219 It uses the ad network’s infor-
mation about people to suggest products to individuals and to steer
them toward one card and not another.220 As [x+1] explains, however,
it does not gather the names of the individuals whose information it
collects and analyzes.221 Thus, behavioral marketing occurs without
identifying, in the traditional sense, any specific individual.
While advertising networks may not know peoples’ names, identi-
fication of individuals is nonetheless possible in many cases. As we
have seen in Part II.A, this result follows for a number of reasons. For
example, enough pieces of information linked to a single person, even
in the absence of a name, social security number, or financial informa-
tion, will permit identification of the individual. Such identification of
seemingly non-PII is, moreover, a genuine possibility.
Nonetheless, online companies have attempted to short circuit
the discussion of privacy harms and necessary legal reforms by simply
asserting that they do not collect PII.222 The Wall Street Journal
reports, “[t]he ad industry says tracking doesn’t violate anyone’s pri-
vacy because the data sold doesn’t identify people by name, and the
tracking activity is disclosed in privacy policies.”223 Or, as the FTC
describes the matter, the position of advertisers is that “there is a
reduced privacy interest in, and risk of harm from, non-PII.”224
This defense suggests what may be a further barrier to adequate
privacy protection in the future: The online marketing industry may
develop a strategic compromise around a PII-based regulatory regime
that employs a narrow definition of PII. Currently, behavioral mar-
keting is regulated only to a limited extent, but legal rules in this area
218 Id.
219 Steel & Angwin, supra note 190.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 E.g., Steve Stecklow, On the Web, Children Face Intensive Tracking, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 17, 2010, at A1 (indicating marketers’ defense that using tracking devices to collect
information from children’s websites does not amount to collection of PII).
223 Julia Angwin & Tom McGinty, Sites Feed Personal Details to New Tracking Industry,
WALL ST. J., July 30, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870397700457539
3173432219064.html.
224 FTC, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES, supra note 180, at 31.
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may soon increase.225 Marketers may thus wish to preemptively influ-
ence the nature of any forthcoming legal reforms. To grasp the impli-
cations of this potential industry strategy, therefore, it is first
necessary to understand the current legal landscape.
At present, there is no specific federal statute regulating these
marketing practices. Some privacy protection is provided through the
oversight of the FTC, which brings actions against companies that vio-
late their own privacy policies.226 In addition to policing the privacy
promises of organizations, the FTC also guards against inadequate
security and promotes transparency. We examine each of these roles
in turn.
On numerous occasions, the FTC has interpreted a company’s
behavior that breaches its stated privacy policy as an “unfair or decep-
tive act” under the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914.227 Still, the
impact of such FTC regulation is limited: The agency merely ensures
that companies live up to their promises, and companies need not
promise much.228 Moreover, studies have shown that few consumers
read privacy policies, and that those who do frequently fail to under-
stand them.229 In fact, consumers commonly and falsely believe that a
website with a posted “privacy policy” necessarily provides a positive
level of substantive protection.230
In addition to the FTC’s actions enforcing privacy policies, the
agency has taken actions against companies that fail to provide ade-
quate data security.231 The FTC can bring such enforcement actions
225 As the New York Times has reported: “The Federal Trade Commission had some
sharp words for Internet advertising companies . . . saying that they simply are not dis-
closing how they collect information about users well enough. And the agency threatened
that the industry had better get its act together—or else.” Saul Hansell, The F.T.C. Talks
Tough on Internet Privacy, NYTIMES.COM (Feb. 12, 2009, 3:53 PM), http://bits.blogs.ny
times.com/2009/02/12/the-ftc-talks-tough-on-internet-privacy.
226 For an overview, see PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW DESKBOOK 16.01 (Lisa J.
Sotto ed., 2010) [hereinafter SOTTO, DESKBOOK]; SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, IPL, supra note
52, at 776–87.
227 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006).
228 For examples of enforcement actions, see Vision I Props., LLC, FTC Docket No. C-
4135 (Apr. 19, 2005); Bonzi Software, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4126 (Oct. 7, 2004);
Gateway Learning Corp., FTC Docket No. C-4120 (Sept. 10, 2004).
229 Thus, the FTC has spoken of “long, incomprehensible privacy policies that con-
sumers typically do not read, let alone understand.” FTC, PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra
note 2, at iii.
230 Id. at 26.
231 See, e.g., ACRAnet, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 092-3088 (Feb. 3, 2011) (settling FTC
charges against a credit report reseller for failing to protect its internet portals and thereby
furnishing credit reports to hackers, through a consent order barring the reseller from
future violations); Twitter, Inc., FTC File No. 092-3093 (June 24, 2010) (settling FTC
charges against social networking site Twitter for consumer deception and inadequate data
security measures that enabled hackers to obtain unauthorized administrative control of
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even in the absence of a data breach, though more typically it acts
only once a data spill has occured.232 As part of these enforcement
actions, such as that against Eli Lilly in 2002, the agency also seeks to
sanction companies for failing to train their employees about ade-
quate privacy and data security practices.233
In the Eli Lilly case, the company had sent out an e-mail message
to customers who had registered for reminders via its Prozac.com
website.234 When Eli Lilly decided to terminate this service, called the
Medi-messenger, it made the mistake of listing the e-mail address of
every person who had registered for the reminders in the “to” line of
the notification e-mail.235 As the FTC noted, “[b]y including the email
addresses of all Medi-messenger subscribers within the . . . email mes-
sage, respondent unintentionally disclosed personal information pro-
vided to it by consumers in connection with their use of the Prozac
.com Web site.”236 The FTC’s complaint faulted the company for its
“failure to maintain or implement internal measures appropriate
under the circumstances to protect sensitive consumer information,”
including its lack of “appropriate training for its employees regarding
consumer privacy and information security” and lack of “appropriate
oversight and . . . checks and controls on the process . . . .”237 In its
settlement order, the FTC required Eli Lilly to “establish and main-
tain an information security program for the protection of personally
identifiable information collected from or about consumers in connec-
tion with the advertising, marketing, offering for sale, or sale of any
Twitter, including access to non-public user information and tweets that consumers had
designated as private); Eli Lilly & Co., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4047 (May 8, 2002) (settling
FTC charges against a pharmaceutical company for unintentional release of the names and
e-mail addresses of Prozac consumers through a consent order necessitating implementa-
tion of privacy and security protections and prohibiting any future false or misleading pri-
vacy statements).
232 See, e.g., United States v. Am. United Mortg. Co., No. 07C-7064 (N.D. Ill. 2007)
(requiring a mortgage company to pay a $50,000 civil penalty for improper disposal of loan
documents containing consumers’ personal and financial information in an unsecured
dumpster); Superior Mortgage Corp., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4153 (Dec. 14, 2005) (settling
FTC charges against a lender for failing to provide reasonable Internet security for
sensitive customer data and falsely claiming that it encrypted data submitted online);
Sunbelt Lending Servs., Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4129 (Jan. 3, 2005) (requiring a com-
pany’s information security program to be certified by an FTC-chosen expert following the
company’s failure to implement safeguards to protect its customers’ financial information
and social security numbers, oversee its service providers, and supervise its loan officers
working in remote offices).
233 Complaint ¶ 7, Eli Lilly & Co., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4047 (May 8, 2002).
234 Id. ¶ 3–4.
235 Id. ¶ 6.
236 Id.
237 Id. ¶ 7.
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pharmaceutical, medical, or other health-related product or
service . . . .”238
Finally, the FTC is beginning to take a broader approach to pri-
vacy based on a concept of transparency. Its policing of privacy
notices and enforcement of adequate data security already moved in
this direction. More broadly than its “broken promises” approach,
however, the agency has begun to take a more substantive approach
to disclosure of company behaviors. Thus, in an enforcement action
against Sears, which was settled in 2009, the FTC alleged that Sears
had engaged in an unfair practice by failing to adequately disclose the
extent to which it tracked customers who were paid to use a program
that would record their Internet browsing.239 The FTC acted even
though Sears had provided users with a license agreement that, albeit
with obscure language, arguably informed users of the tracking.240 The
FTC charged that Sears’s failure to provide adequate disclosure of the
scope of the data collection was a deceptive act.241 Its settlement order
required Sears to provide clear and prominent disclosure of “the types
of data that the [software] will monitor, record, or transmit . . . .”242
The FTC’s enforcement of transparency continued in 2010 with a
settlement against EchoMetrix.243 In that case, “parental controls”
software, marketed as a way for parents to track their children’s
online activities, also secretly collected data about children’s computer
activity and fed the resulting information to marketers.244 The FTC’s
theory of the case was that the company provided inadequate disclo-
sure of its tracking.245 Finally, in a 2010 Report, the FTC explicitly
emphasized companies’ obligation to increase the transparency of
their data practices.246
With this legal landscape as a backdrop, we now turn to the pos-
sible industry strategy of compromise. With Congress appearing eager
to enact legislation in this area, affected companies might accept some
kind of PII-based regulation while insisting on a restricted definition
of PII. This strategy would serve as a kind of red herring to regulators.
238 Decision and Order at II, Eli Lilly & Co., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4047 (May 8, 2002).
239 Complaint ¶¶ 13–14, Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4264 (Aug.
31, 2009).
240 Id. ¶ 8.
241 Id. ¶ 14.
242 Decision and Order at IA, Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4264
(Aug. 31, 2009).
243 Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v.
EchoMetrix, Inc., No. CV10-5516 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010).
244 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v.
EchoMetrix, Inc., No. CV10-5516 ¶¶ 8–14 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010).
245 Id. ¶¶ 16–18.
246 FTC, PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 69–79.
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It would allow marketers to achieve the same goals using the same
tools of behavioral marketing. Thus, the online marketing industry
may be willing to make seemingly large compromises on PII-based
privacy regulation because it will still be able to influence consumer
behavior that falls outside the definition of PII in ways that many
would view as troublesome.
This strategy is well captured by a quotation from a newspaper
story about U.S. websites installing as many as one hundred tracking
tools at a single time on the computers of people visiting their sites.
The reporters stated that “[t]he ad industry says tracking doesn’t
violate anyone’s privacy because the data sold doesn’t identify people
by name, and the tracking activity is disclosed in privacy policies.”247
The strategy encapsulated in this quotation is two-pronged; it pro-
poses that (1) as non-PII, the information collected and the tracking
that it enables fall outside of a PII-based regulatory regime, and (2) as
long as they are described in a privacy notice, these same practices fall
outside the FTC’s oversight of unfair and deceptive practices. In light
of these challenges to PII-based regulation, this Article seeks to revisit
the current paradigm of PII.
B. Food Marketing to Youth
As the last section demonstrated, marketing has changed greatly
over the last century and is now conducted in highly sophisticated and
potent ways. Marketing using personal information is focused not only
on adults, but also on youth, a term that public health experts define
to include children and adolescents. This group’s access to large
amounts of disposable income and its incompletely-developed tastes
and interests make them appealing targets.
Marketing to youth and the impact of legal definitions of PII raise
distinct issues in part because American law generally views youth as
deserving of special protection. Policymakers are also highly con-
cerned about food marketing to children and eager to act to assist
parents in promoting healthy diets. In short, policymakers consider
youth, and especially children, to be particularly susceptible to adver-
tising. The fear is of marketing’s strong role in influencing youth to
consume high-calorie and low-nutrient foods.248 Therefore, this
Article will separately analyze marketing issues that concern youth.
247 Angwin & McGinty, supra note 223, at 1.
248 For a summary of the available research, see INST. OF MED., FOOD MARKETING TO
CHILDREN AND YOUTH: THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY? 226–318 (J. Michael McGinnis et al.
eds., 2006) [hereinafter FOOD MARKETING TO CHILDREN AND YOUTH].
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1. Digital Marketing and the “Net Generation”
In 1998, Don Tapscott announced that “[t]he Net Generation has
arrived!”249 Tapscott identified a new age cohort, the first to grow up
surrounded by digital media, and predicted that this generation would
be more interested in and affected by interactive digital media than
traditional broadcast media such as television.250 In addition, the
commercialization of the web and associated digital devices occurred
all but simultaneously with the emergence of these new technologies.
As Jeff Chester and Kathryn Montgomery observe, “[t]he rapid
growth of the Internet and proliferation of digital media are funda-
mentally transforming how corporations do business with young
people in the twenty-first century.”251 Corporations have actively
sought to shape the experiences of minors using these new media.
Digital marketing is also directed more intensively toward youth
than adults. In September 2010, the Wall Street Journal reported that
the fifty most popular websites aimed at children install more tracking
devices on personal computers than do the top sites for adults.252
Digital marketing now occurs around many kinds of products and ser-
vices, including food products, to young consumers using quite precise
information collected about a data subject’s characteristics, interests,
and hobbies.253 With access to enormous amounts of disposable
income, young people will continue to be an attractive audience for
marketers. Due to the public health crisis in the United States around
youth obesity, we will now focus on marketing activities that involve
food products.
Over the past three decades, the extent of obesity among minors
has risen dramatically throughout the United States. In 2007, over
one-third of children and adolescents in the United States were obese
or overweight.254 This number represents triple the rate in 1980.255 A
249 DON TAPSCOTT, GROWING UP DIGITAL: THE RISE OF THE NET GENERATION 1
(1998).
250 Id. at 2–6. Tapscott returned to this generational topic a decade later and found that
among other impacts of the digital age, young people “expect speed” in all interactions,
“not just in video games.” DON TAPSCOTT, GROWN UP DIGITAL: HOW THE NET
GENERATION IS CHANGING YOUR WORLD 93 (2009).
251 CHESTER & MONTGOMERY, INTERACTIVE MARKETING, supra note 180, at 13.
252 Stecklow, supra note 222, at 1. The fifty websites most popular with minors placed
4123 pieces of tracking technologies on the newspaper’s test computers, which was thirty
percent higher than the fifty most popular general-audience U.S. websites. Id.
253 See Angwin, supra note 190 (detailing the precision with which individuals’ prefer-
ences can be targeted using data tracking tools); Stecklow, supra note 222 (indicating that
such data tracking is heavily focused on children).
254 TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, F AS IN FAT: HOW OBESITY THREATENS
AMERICA’S FUTURE 7 (2011), available at http://healthyamericans.org/reports/obesity2011/
Obesity2011Report.pdf.
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different study from 2005 raised the possibility that diet-related dis-
eases will cause today’s children to be the first generation in the
United States to have a shorter life span than their parents.256 The
stakes are high; as the Institute of Medicine has declared,
“[p]revention of obesity in children and youth should be a national
public health priority.”257
Experts view the public health crisis of obesity among youth as
having multiple roots. Nonetheless, experts agree about the detri-
mental effect of the marketing of food products to minors. As the
Institute of Medicine concisely declared, “[m]arketing works.”258 In
more detail, but to the same effect, a review in 2009 of the relevant
psychological research on food marketing stated, “[y]outh marketing
is powerfully effective, occurs in massive amounts, and is done in
forms that thwart cognitive defenses and subvert parents’ ability to
monitor what their children see and ultimately their ability to provide
their children a healthy food environment.”259
Children and adolescents are highly vulnerable to food mar-
keting. For example, psychologists have shown that “marketing effects
occur even in the absence of conscious awareness of marketing
stimuli.”260 The net result is summarized by three psychologists:
“Marketing practices that promote calorie-dense, nutrient-poor food
directly to children and adolescents present significant public health
risk.”261
In light of the migration of youth to the Internet and other digital
environments and the power of marketing on decisions about food
consumption, it is hardly surprising that the food industry has actively
embraced behavioral marketing to minors. As one corporate execu-
tive explained, his company moved away from traditional TV adver-
tising into new forms of digital marketing because “[t]he eyeballs have
255 Id. at 11.
256 S.J. Olshansky et al., A Potential Decline in Life Expectancy in the United States in
the 21st Century, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1138, 1139, 1141 (2005).
257 INST. OF MED., PREVENTING CHILDHOOD OBESTITY: HEALTH IN THE BALANCE 5
(Jeffrey P. Koplan et al. eds., 2005). The New York Times has observed that the current
public health focus appears to be shifting from the effort against tobacco to obesity. Duff
Wilson, A Shift Toward Fighting Fat, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010, at B1.
258 FOOD MARKETING TO CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 248, at xiii; see also
ELIZABETH S. MOORE, IT’S CHILD’S PLAY: ADVERGAMING AND THE ONLINE MARKETING
OF FOOD TO CHILDREN 1–2 (2006), available at http://www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/
7536.pdf (discussing marketing to children).
259 Jennifer L. Harris et al., The Food Marketing Defense Model: Integrating
Psychological Research To Protect Youth and Inform Public Policy, 3 SOC. ISSUES & POL’Y
REV. 211, 255 (2009).
260 Id. at 224.
261 Id. at 211.
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moved.”262 Food and beverage companies are now among the leaders
of the new one-to-one digital marketing system.263
Sometimes as part of behavioral marketing and sometimes dis-
tinctly, advertisers use other advertising techniques to sell food to
youth. Among these practices are viral marketing, “advergaming,”
and individual targeting through social media platforms such as
Facebook.264 The cutting edge of marketing now involves the use of
“command centers” in which corporations’ staff members directly
interact with select consumers. As an example, Gatorade has devel-
oped a “Mission Control” center that tracks developments in the
social media ether.265 In the center, Gatorade employees monitor
social media posts twenty-four hours a day.266 Once someone men-
tions Gatorade in Twitter or other online media, the staff can weigh in
and interact with the consumer.267
As a final point, some empirical evidence suggests “an especially
damaging potential role of targeted food marketing on at-risk
minority youth.”268 The available evidence is far from conclusive,
however, due to a relative lack of research focusing on minority popu-
lations and food marketing. Nonetheless, there are indications that
“targeted food marketing efforts that focus on minorities’ social iden-
tity” heighten “the unhealthy influence of these messages.”269
2. Marketing, Legal Enforcement, and the Question of Children’s
PII
The same basic issues concerning PII in the context of digital
marketing arise for youth as well as for adults. Companies now track
young people through personal profiles that exclude names, but con-
tain a wealth of details about the individual. The law responds differ-
262 CHESTER & MONTGOMERY, INTERACTIVE MARKETING, supra note 180, at 13–14.
263 Id. at 61.
264 On viral marketing and other techniques, see CHESTER & MONTGOMERY,
INTERACTIVE MARKETING, supra note 180, at 2 (2008). On Facebook’s use of the “like”
button, to allow “effective word-of-mouth marketing on a large, global scale,” see
FACEBOOK, BUILDING YOUR BRAND ON FACEBOOK 16–17 (2010), http://
ads.ak.facebook.com/ads/FacebookAds/Facebook_MediaKit_2010_US.pdf.
Advergaming is a form of “branded entertainment” in which a brand, such as M&M or
Oscar Mayer Lunchables is placed within a digital entertainment property. MOORE, supra
note 258, at 1.
265 Valerie Bauerlein, Gatorade’s ‘Mission’: Sell More Drinks, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14,
2010, at B6.
266 Id. 
267 Id.
268 Harris et al., supra note 259, at 245.
269 Id. See also INST. OF MED., supra note 257, at 58–61 (examining relevant information
about socioeconomic and ethnic make up of high-risk groups for childhood obesity).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\86-6\NYU603.txt unknown Seq: 50 28-NOV-11 15:01
December 2011] THE PII PROBLEM 1863
ently, however, when this practice is directed toward youth. While
there is no federal statute that regulates digital marketing to adults,
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) establishes
certain rules for marketing to young children.270 COPPA seeks to pro-
tect children under the age of thirteen,271 and it mandates that a cov-
ered website have a posted privacy policy and obtain parental consent
before collecting, using, and disclosing children’s information.272 The
statute also grants the FTC an enforcement role for its mandates.273
The FTC has responded vigorously with sixteen enforcement actions,
and over $6 million levied in fines pursuant to settlements.274 Its most
recent COPPA enforcement action, in May of 2011, led to a settle-
ment that included a $3 million fine against an operator of online “vir-
tual worlds.”275
COPPA has several notable weaknesses. First, it applies only to
children under thirteen.276 Advertisers and marketers can therefore
ply their trade with teenagers without being affected by the statute.
Yet, teenagers may be even more vulnerable to targeted marketing
than are younger children.277 Second, COPPA extends only to a “web-
site or online service,” and thus does not regulate new digital plat-
270 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2006).
271 Id. § 6501(1).
272 Id. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii).
273 Id. § 6501(8)(F).
274 United States v. Playdom, Inc., No. 11-00724 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2011); United States
v. Iconix Brand Grp., Inc., No. 09-8864 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2009); United States v. Sony
BMG Music Entm’t, No. 08-10730 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008); United States v. Industrious
Kid, Inc., No. 08-0639 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2008); United States v. Xanga.com, Inc., No. 06-
6853 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2006); United States v. UMG Recordings, Inc., No. 04-1050 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 25, 2004); United States v. Mrs. Fields Famous Brands, Inc., No. 2:03-205 (D.
Utah Apr. 4, 2003); United States v. Hershey Foods Corp., No. 4: 03-350 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 6,
2003); United States v. Ohio Art Co., F.T.C. File No. 022-3028 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 22, 2002);
United States v. Am. Pop Corn Co., No. 02-4008 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 28, 2002); United States
v. Lisa Frank, Inc., No. 01-1516 (E.D. Va. Oct. 3, 2001); United States v. Monarch Serv.,
Inc., No. 01-1165 (D. Md. Apr. 20, 2001); United States v. Looksmart, Ltd., No. 01-606
(E.D. Va. Apr. 19, 2001); United States v. Bigmailbox.com, Inc., No. 01-605 (E.D. Va. Apr.
19, 2001); FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-11341 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2000); Bonzi
Software, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4126 (Oct. 7, 2004). For a concise discussion of
COPPA enforcement actions, see SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 110–11.
275 Consent Decree and Order for Civil Penalties, Injunction and Other Relief ¶ 19,
United States v. Playdom, Inc., No. 11-00724 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2011) (levying $3 million
fine); Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunction and Other Relief ¶ 11, United States v.
Playdom, Inc., No. 11-00724 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2011) (describing the defendant’s online
activities).
276 15 U.S.C. § 6501(1).
277 See Harris et al., supra note 259, at 236–37 (indicating that social science has shown
that the impact of “[m]edia, including marketing messages” is especially strong for “older
children and adolescents . . . as they focus more on the world beyond their families and
actively develop their independent identities”).
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forms that are independent of the Internet, such as cell phones.278
Third, COPPA only regulates a website or online service if it is
“directed to children,” or if the operator of the website “has actual
knowledge that it is collecting personal information from a child.”279
It is relatively easy for website operators to avoid acquiring actual
knowledge that they are collecting information from a child.280
Even if these problems with COPPA are addressed, the statute
still suffers from a fundamental flaw: its concept of PII. COPPA
defines PII through the specific-types paradigm,281 but it employs this
approach with a twist. In addition to setting out a traditional list of
types of PII (first and last name, social security number, e-mail
address, and other elements), it provides an authorization for the FTC
to add additional factors to that list.282 Although the FTC made lim-
ited use of this power in its COPPA Rule in 2000, adding “a persistent
identifier” used to track a person to the list,283 the statute’s key con-
cept remains whether or not the “identifier” will permit “the physical
or online contacting of a specific individual.”284 The meaning of “con-
tacting of a specific individual” remains unresolved. Marketers will
argue, and the FTC is likely to agree, that it is not a “contacting of a
specific individual” when targeted ads are served to children. Support
for this proposition is found in the FTC’s definition of “online contact
information” as “an e-mail address or any other substantially similar
identifier that permits direct contact with a person online.”285
278 15 U.S.C. § 6501(2)(A). Indeed, the FTC in 2007 had already noted that children’s
access to the Internet was increasingly taking place on mobile devices rather than personal
computers. FTC, IMPLEMENTING THE CHILDREN’S ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT 2
(2007) [hereinafter FTC, COPPA REPORT]. In this report, the FTC also identified chal-
lenges to COPPA in social- networking sites and the convergence of wireless and landline
communications with the Internet. Id. at 25–27.
279 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A) (2006). General-audience websites that have a special sec-
tion for children are also subject to COPPA, as the statute explicitly applies to “that por-
tion of a commercial website or online service that is targeted to children.” Id.
§ 6501(10)(A).
280 As a result of this requirement, many websites that might otherwise fall under
COPPA have a simple way of avoiding its reach: using drop-down age menus, which
require a user to indicate their age before being allowed access to the site. Of course, it is
not especially difficult for children to determine the appropriate birthday that will allow
them to access a website.
281 See supra Part I.B.3 (describing the specific-types paradigm).
282 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8)(A)–(F).
283 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2011).
284 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8)(F).
285 16 C.F.R. § 312.2.
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IV
PII 2.0
The existing definitions of PII have proven problematic.
Nonetheless, we reject the idea that privacy law should abandon the
concept of PII. If it did so, privacy law would be left without a means
for establishing coherent boundaries on necessary regulation.
Therefore, we reconceptualize the current standard by introducing PII
2.0, compare the new model to existing approaches in the United
States and the European Union, and defend this new approach against
possible objections. Finally, we apply this proposal to behavioral mar-
keting to adults and targeted food marketing to children.
A. Should Privacy Law Abandon the Concept of PII?
The PII problem appears daunting, and a dramatic solution
would be to abandon PII as a central concept in information privacy
law. Indeed, Paul Ohm argues that the concept of PII is unworkable
and unfixable. According to Ohm, “No matter how effectively regula-
tors follow the latest re-identification research, folding newly identi-
fied data fields into new laws and regulations, researchers will always
find more data field types they have not yet covered. The list of poten-
tial PII categories will never stop growing until it includes every-
thing.”286 In Ohm’s analogy, the attempt to define PII is as futile as
the classic carnival game of “whack-a-mole.” As he explains it, “As
soon as you whack one mole, another will pop right up.”287
In fairness to Ohm, his primary focus is not on abandoning PII,
but on alerting the legal academy and policy makers to the problem of
new means for re-identification of data.288 This effort is a valuable and
meritorious one. Nevertheless, his argument goes further when it sug-
gests that privacy law be reoriented around a different concept than
PII. In place of PII, Ohm proposes that regulators seek to “prevent
privacy harm by squeezing and reducing the flow of information in
society, even though in doing so they may need to sacrifice, at least a
little, important counter values like innovation, free speech, and
security.”289 He would thus replace the current reliance on PII as a
gatekeeper for privacy law with a cost-benefit analysis for all data
286 Ohm, supra note 6, at 1742.
287 Id.
288 See id. at 1703–04 (“This Article is the first to comprehensively incorporate an
important new subspecialty of computer science, reidentification science, into legal
scholarship.”).
289 Id. at 1706.
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processing and data collection of any kind.290 Ohm proposes that pri-
vacy regulation “should weigh the benefits of unfettered information
flow against the costs of privacy harms.”291
Abandoning PII is problematic, however, because the concept
serves a crucial function: it establishes the boundaries of privacy regu-
lation. Without some concept of PII, there would be no limits on the
scope of privacy law. In a world overflowing with information, the law
cannot possibly regulate all of it. Yet, without adequate boundaries on
regulation, privacy rights would expand to protect a nearly infinite
array of information, including practically every piece of statistical or
demographic data. The law would encompass nearly every fact about
human behavior, no matter how generalized. Moreover, Ohm’s pro-
posal to assess the costs and benefits of every collection and release of
data would be tremendously difficult because all costs and benefits are
rarely known in advance. Ohm suggests that when in doubt, the law
should limit the release or even the creation of large data sets.292 Such
data sets, however, play an important role in research, health care,
data security, and the dissemination of knowledge generally.
In health care research, an important distinction is now drawn
between clinical trials, the traditional form of health care research,
and new “information based” forms of inquiry.293 In clinical trials,
patients volunteer or are paid to participate in specific studies that test
new medical interventions. In contrast, in information-based research,
there is “analysis of data and biological samples that were initially col-
lected for diagnostic, treatment, or billing purposes, or that were col-
lected as part of other research projects.”294 The Institute of Medicine
has noted that such information-driven research has “led to significant
discoveries, the development of new therapies, and a remarkable
improvement in health care and public health.”295
These benefits have included the development of the cancer
treatment therapy Herceptin, the use of an “open source” approach to
Alzheimer’s research, and increased medical database research on
children’s health. As an initial example, through analysis of the
records of a cohort of 9000 breast cancer patients, scientists were able
290 See id. at 1768 (proposing that regulators restrict data processing and collection
when the costs to privacy outweigh the benefits of the information).
291 Id. at 1759.
292 See id. at 1766–68 (suggesting that the size of data sets should be a regulatory consid-
eration, and that regulation should restrict the creation and release of data sets).
293 See INST. OF MED., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY,
IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 112 (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds., 2009) (“[A]n
increasingly large portion of health research is now information based.”).
294 Id.
295 Id. at 113.
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to identify the HER-2 oncogene and develop a targeted therapy for
treating women with breast cancer who fall into this genetic cate-
gory.296 In another major research effort, one that started in 2003, uni-
versities, the drug and medical-imaging industries, and nonprofit
groups joined in a collaborative effort to find biological markers that
reveal the progression of Alzheimer’s disease in the human brain.297
As the New York Times summarized, “[t]he key to the Alzheimer’s
project was an agreement as ambitious as its goal: . . . to share all the
data, making every single finding public immediately, available to
anyone with a computer anywhere in the world.”298 There already
have been more than 3200 downloads of the entire data set, and
almost a million downloads of the database that contains images from
brain scans.299 As a final example, medical database research has
improved children’s health. Leading examples of this research are the
discovery that supplementing folic acid during pregnancy can prevent
neural tube birth defects, and the identification of the negative effects
of intrauterine DES exposure.300
Analytics also play an important role in data security. For
example, a multi-institutional response is necessary to combat data
security breaches.301 One of the most important requirements of such
a response is the sharing of information about security attacks among
different entities to minimize harm and to increase the relevant
knowledge among private organizations, governmental entities, and
the public.302 Elements of such a coordinated response are beginning
to emerge. Companies in the private sector now offer services that
draw on information from multiple organizations to spot data anoma-
lies that can identify malicious activities.303
296 Id. at 114.
297 Gina Kolata, Rare Sharing of Data Led to Results on Alzheimer’s, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
13, 2010, at A1. The data are posted online. ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE NEUROIMAGING
INITIATIVE, http://adni.loni.ucla.edu/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
298 Kolata, supra note 297, at A1.
299 Id.
300 INST. OF MED., supra note 293, at 114. In a recent study that used database analysis,
Flaura Winston and other researchers drew on “child-focused crash surveillance informa-
tion” reported to the State Farm Insurance Companies in fifteen states and the District of
Columbia and then shared with the Partners for Child Passenger Safety. Flaura K. Winston
et al., The Danger of Premature Graduation to Seat Belts for Young Children, 105
PEDIATRICS 1179, 1179–80 (2000).
301 See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches,
105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 918, 959–70 (2007) (arguing that effectively addressing data
breaches would require a “multi-institutional, coordinated response” to mitigate harm to
consumers and to improve security to prevent future breaches).
302 Id. at 962.
303 For example, ID Analytics draws on information about 2.6 million frauds and 1.4
billion consumer transactions in its national, cross-industry compilation of identity infor-
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Analytics are also used in creating new products and services for
direct use by individuals. For example, Google Flu Trends is a free
service that furthers early detection of influenza epidemics throughout
the world.304 Epidemics of seasonal influenza are a major public
health issue. They cause between 250,000 and 500,000 deaths world-
wide annually as well as tens of millions of cases of respiratory ill-
ness.305 There is also growing concern about the possibility of a future
pandemic causing millions of possible fatalities worldwide if a new
strain of influenza virus emerges.306 Scientists at Google and the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have developed a method
of analyzing large numbers of Google search queries to track
influenza-like illnesses in different parts of the world. The technique
monitors health-seeking behavior, specifically the online search que-
ries that millions of individuals submit to the Google search engine
each day.307
Although analytics have great benefits, they can also implicate
information privacy concerns. Still, an approach in which the first step
is to restrict the flow of information is a move in the wrong direction,
especially because new technology is increasing the benefits from
analysis of large data sets in ways we might not be able to predict in
advance. The general approach to information flow in the United
States is a “Schillerian” one. As Friedrich Schiller wrote in
Wallensteins Lager: “Was nicht verboten ist, ist erlaubt” (“What is not
forbidden is allowed”).308 Applying his insight to privacy law, one
might say that all information collection and processing that is not
specifically forbidden by law is permitted.309 This approach wisely
encourages the flow of information and the benefits it brings, while
building in restrictions where it can cause problems. Shifting to a
regime where the full benefits and costs must be weighed in advance
might prevent the discovery of new benefits and overly constrain
information flow. Moreover, an ex ante cost-benefit analysis would be
mation. Technology: ID Network , IDANALYTICS.COM, http://www.idanalytics.com/
technology/index.php#id-network (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
304 Jeremy Ginsberg et al., Detecting Influenza Epidemics Using Search Engine Query
Data, 457 NATURE 1012, 1014 (2009).
305 Influenza (Seasonal), Fact Sheet N°211, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 2009), http://
www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs211/en/.
306 Ginsberg et al., supra note 304, at 1012.
307 Id. at 1014.
308 FRIEDRICH SCHILLER, Wallensteins Lager, in 4 FRIEDRICH SCHILLER WERKE UND
BRIEFE, act 1, sc. 6 (von Otto Dann et al. eds., Deutscher Lassiker Verlag 2000) (1798).
309 See Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 908-16 (2009)
(contrasting a European Union approach to information privacy centered on prevention of
harm with the United States approach based on “regulatory parsimony,” or avoiding
unnecessary regulation of information flow).
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so speculative in nature that its accuracy and usefulness would be
questionable. And, any kind of presumptive rejection of the collection
and dissemination of large data sets will constitute a major sacrifice of
potential benefits.
Privacy rights should attach when data pertain to particular
people. The disclosure that there are nine million people living in New
York City does not create a privacy harm for any specific New Yorker.
Of course, certain types of aggregate data can be used in harmful
ways. For example, banks might draw on a statistical indication that a
certain demographic group has a much higher default rate to deny
loans to members of this group or to charge them higher rates. In
addition, actuarial data from insurance companies affects coverage
and rate decisions. These decisions can be harmful, and information
does play a role in these harms. Nonetheless, this category of harm is
far broader than the category of information privacy harms. As a
policy matter, these issues raise questions that predominately sound in
civil rights, discrimination, and insurance law.310 At least as far as the
analysis of aggregate data is concerned, the critical issues in these
areas are not those of information privacy law.
When a privacy harm is created, it is because the data disclosed
or used pertains to specific individuals. Disclosing that 10,000 copies
of a particular book were sold does not implicate privacy; this is just a
piece of information. Disclosing that a particular book was sold to a
particular person does implicate information privacy.311 The privacy
harm, or the potential for it, is created by linking the information to
an individual. This result does not mean that the harm following upon
a linkage of data to a particular person is exclusively an individual
one—indeed, the resulting harm can affect all of society.312 Thus, the
individual capacity for self-determination can be harmed by informa-
310 For a discussion of antidiscrimination law, see generally TIMOTHY P. GLYNN ET AL.,
EMPLOYMENT LAW 515–43 (2007). Regarding civil rights and discrimination based on
information about one’s neighborhood, Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment
Act in 1977 to prevent lenders from discriminatory credit practices against inhabitants of
low-income neighborhoods, a practice known as redlining. Community Reinvestment Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 (1977).
311 Whether or not the United States provides enough protections in privacy law for
such information is, of course, another matter. For a discussion of the inadequacies of
American privacy law, see SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, IPL, supra note 52, at 565–72.
312 For example, the disclosure of a person’s membership in an organization can limit
the freedom of association of groups seeking to affect social change. See Bates v. City of
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960) (striking down state ordinance requiring the disclo-
sure of NAACP’s members and contributors); NAACP v. Alabama, 347 U.S. 449, 461–63
(1958) (finding that the Constitution, by protecting the freedom of association, prevents a
state from requiring disclosure of lists of members of lawful associations absent some over-
riding valid interest of the state).
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tion surveillance, which, in turn, will have a negative effect on the
maintenance of a democratic order.313
B. A Standard for PII
In devising an approach to conceptualize PII, the first step is to
determine whether it should be defined as a rule or a standard. As we
have noted earlier, a standard is an open-ended decision making yard-
stick, and a rule is a harder-edged decision making tool.314 The discus-
sion of PII in the law has not yet considered the issue of whether PII
ought to be a rule or a standard, but this issue is of paramount impor-
tance and an essential first step.
We can now revisit the current state of play concerning PII. The
first model, the tautological approach, ultimately rests on the circular
notion that PII is personal information. The second model, the non-
public approach, defines PII as that data which is not publicly avail-
able. Finally, the third model, the specific-types approach, expressly
lists the kinds of data that are PII. As previously discussed, the first
two are standards, and the third is a rule. The distinction between
rules and standards also provides a window into the current failure of
all three approaches.
Standards, as we have seen in the tautological and non-public
approaches, permit broad discretion and allow the decision maker to
take into account relevant factors.315 To illustrate, consider the
VPPA’s definition of PII as “information which identifies a person,”
or the Cable Act’s explanation of this same concept as anything other
than “aggregate data.”316 In both statutes, the use of a standard per-
mits freedom in deciding which factors to take into account. The deci-
sion maker can identify these factors based on the original policy.317
The result is a better fit between policy and the facts at hand.
Yet, the two kinds of standards used in information policy law
have not led to good decision making in identifying PII. Due to any
standard’s inevitable generality, the problematic tendency has been to
interpret a specific definition of PII as applying only to information
313 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1609, 1653–58 (1999) (discussing how privacy harms can undermine a Civic Republican
understanding of self-determination from a lack of sufficient protections).
314 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
315 Sullivan, supra note 70, at 58–59 (“Standards allow the decisionmaker to take into
account all relevant factors or the totality of the circumstances.”).
316 Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3) (2006); Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(2)(A) (2006).
317 See Sullivan, supra note 70, at 58 (“A legal directive is ‘standard’-like when it tends
to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or
policy to a fact situation.”).
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that taken in isolation, in that single case, actually identifies a specific
individual. We will call this viewpoint the “reductionist reading” of
PII. Such an interpretation ignores the dangers of re-identification
and other issues that we discussed in Part III. The reductionist ten-
dency pervades U.S. law at present, and we attempt to overcome this
problem in our definition of PII. To be sure, a second risk also exists—
that too much information could be considered PII. We associate such
an “expansionist tendency” with the European Union and respond to
it as well in crafting our definition.
As for the third category, the specific-types approach lists certain
kinds of data that fall within the category of PII. The resulting
attempts at a rule, however, prove either too narrow, as in the
Massachusetts breach notification statute,318 or outdated, as in the
COPPA Rule.319 As Kathleen Sullivan pointed out in 1991, one
problem with rules is that they “tend toward obsolescence.”320 Indeed,
while COPPA permits the FTC to add to the definition of PII, this
authorization has languished unused since 2000.321 Here, we can draw
on the insight of Louis Kaplow, who noted that rules require the legal
system to expend more work ex ante, and standards require it to
engage in more work ex post.322 As Kaplow observed, “[w]hen the
government promulgates a rule, it gathers information before individ-
uals act and announces its findings.”323 The difficulty for rules is that
the government entity designated to revise them may be unable or
unwilling to expend the necessary resources to do so.324 As an illustra-
tion, the FTC has been gridlocked around marketing to children and
has not changed the COPPA Rule for over a decade.
In sum, we view the current condition of PII, whether defined in
terms of either standards or rules, as deeply unsatisfactory. In moving
forward, we opt for a reconceptualization of a standard for PII and
not a rule. We do so for three reasons.
First, standards are generally the superior choice for dealing with
situations of rapid change, because, as mentioned, rules can become
318 Massachusetts Security Breach Law, 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.00 (2011). For dis-
cussion of the deficiencies in the Massachusetts statute’s definition of PII, see supra notes
92–93 and accompanying text.
319 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2006).
For discussion of the deficiencies in the COPPA definition of PII, see supra notes 113–16
and accompanying text.
320 Sullivan, supra note 70, at 66.
321 See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.1 (2011) (showing
last changes from over a decade ago).
322 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
559–63 (1992).
323 Id. at 585.
324 See id. at 623.
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obsolete.325 Indeed, rules function best when an area of social and
technological development has reached a fairly settled state. Sullivan
observed that a rule reflects an area of “epistemological maturity.”326
The many routes to the creation of PII do not fit into a set of neat
categories, and the technology of tracking and the science of re-
identification will continue to develop in ways that legal decision
makers are unlikely to anticipate.
A second ground to prefer defining PII as a standard is the heter-
ogeneous nature of the behavior to be regulated. As this Article has
demonstrated,327 the means to track individuals and re-identify infor-
mation are diverse. Numerous scholars, including Isaac Ehrlich and
Richard Posner, have demonstrated that rules are quite poor for han-
dling situations involving heterogeneous types of behavior that should
be treated differently.328 Capturing these behaviors in a rule, or a
series of rules, is only possible through a highly detailed codification,
and such extensive statutory detail often fails to adapt well to techno-
logical change.
At the same time, and as a third benefit, a standard for PII has
the further merit of being capable of identifying discrete areas in
which rules will be more useful for defining data as PII or non-PII. If
developments in technology and society around a certain subcategory
of data use become settled, it may become possible to formulate
harder-edged rules to supplement a broad standard. In this way, there
can be a “back-and-forth pattern” between standards and rules over
time.329 These many factors suggest that the best starting point for
information privacy law, at least under present conditions, is to con-
ceive of PII as a standard. The question then becomes what the nature
of this standard is. In the next section, we consider two existing
models: (1) the United States’ reductionist approach to PII, and (2)
the European Union’s expansionist approach.
C. Reductionism, Expansionism, and PII 2.0
Information privacy law is now divided between reductionist and
expansionist regulation of PII. The United States and the European
Union offer examples of the former and the latter, respectively. Both
325 Sullivan, supra note 70, at 66.
326 Id. at 62.
327 See supra Part III.
328 See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 257, 268 (1974) (describing “the necessarily imperfect fit
between the coverage of a rule and the conduct sought to be regulated”).
329 Rose, supra note 70, at 580.
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approaches are flawed. In this section we develop a different concept,
which we term “PII 2.0.”
1. Reductionism in the United States
In the United States, as we have seen, the law often engages in a
reductionist reading of PII. This tendency manifests itself when stat-
utes, judges, or policy makers consider PII to be only information that
refers to a currently identified person. Although computer scientists
and data security experts in the United States recognize the category
of identifiable information, the law has by and large failed to under-
stand this concept. Identified information already refers to a specific
person, while identifiability suggests that such a connection has not
yet occurred, but is possible. To be sure, the first “I” in the acronym
PII is supposed to represent identifiable, but most legal definitions of
PII only focus on identified individuals.
As an example of this interpretation of PII, consider the FTC’s
view of a “persistent identifier,” such as a cookie. As we have argued
above, evidence suggests that the FTC views the applicable statutory
language and its own COPPA rule as regulating this technology only
when there is information about an “identified” person.330 An activity
that falls within the COPPA rule would be a company gathering infor-
mation about a person and then using it to send her an e-mail.331
However, when a company engages in the same information gath-
ering, only to send the same person a targeted ad based on cookies
placed on her computer, it is likely to fall outside the COPPA rule.
Another example of the reductionist tendency in the United
States involves the Privacy Act’s definition of a “system of records,”
which turns on whether federal agency records involve an “identified”
person.332 The Privacy Act does not apply to data processing if a
person is identifiable within a federal agency’s database, but is not
located through a unique identifier.
2. Expansionism in the European Union
In comparison, the European Union takes an expansionist
approach to PII. For example, the E.U. Data Protection Directive
defines “personal data” as “information relating to an identified or
330 See supra Part I.B.3.
331 See FTC, COPPA REPORT, supra note 278, at 8 (discussing applicability of the
COPPA Rule to e-mail communications).
332 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). See supra notes 45–47 and accompa-
nying text (describing the approaches of federal laws and the Privacy Act specifically to
PII).
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identifiable natural person.”333 This accord sets out common rules for
data protection in European Union Member States and requires these
countries to enact legislation that follows its standards.334 Through
this supranational agreement, a definition of PII extending to identifi-
able individuals has been fixed deep in the DNA of European Union
information privacy law. The E.U. Data Protection Directive defines
“an identifiable” person as “one who can be identified, directly, or
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to
one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, eco-
nomic, cultural, or social identity.”335 Of some additional definitional
assistance, the Directive in its Recital 26 explains that in determining
whether a person is identifiable, “account should be taken of all the
means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any
other person to identify the said person.”336
In the European Union, moreover, information that refers to an
identifiable person is treated in the same fashion as that which refers
to an identified person. The treatment in privacy of identified and
identifiable as equivalents is a German innovation. The German
Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, or BDSG) of
1977 defines “personal data” information as data relating to both
“identified” and “identifiable” individuals.337 Whether the data are
identified or identifiable proves, however, to be irrelevant. As Ulrich
Dammann writes in the leading treatise on the Federal Data
Protection Law statute, there is “personal data” if “the reference
person is identifiable.”338 He adds, “[i]t is irrelevant for the BDSG’s
application whether the person is identified or identifiable.”339
To be sure, the early concern in European Union law for the risks
of identifiable data has proven prescient. In 1978, Dammann had
already zeroed in on a threat that he called “re-individualization” (Re-
Individualisierung) of data.340 He observed that “[w]here the
333 Council Directive 95/46, on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 2(a), 1995 O.J.
(L 281) 31, 38 [hereinafter E.U. Data Protection Directive]. For background on the
Directive, see Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and Restrictions on
International Data Flows, 80 IOWA L. REV. 471, 480–83 (1995).
334 Schwartz, supra note 333, at 484.
335 E.U. Data Protection Directive, supra note 333, art. 2(a).
336 Id. at Recital 26.
337 Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], Jan. 14, 2003,
BGBL. I at 66, last amended Aug. 14, 2009, BGBL. I at 2814 (Ger.).
338 ULRICH DAMMANN, KOMMENTAR ZUM BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ § 3, marginal
no. 22 (Spiros Simitis ed., 6th ed. 2006).
339 Id. § 3, marginal no. 23.
340 ULRICH DAMMANN, KOMMENTAR ZUM BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ § 2, marginal
no. 25 (Spiros Simitis ed., 1st ed. 1978).
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layperson sees only statistical tables, the mathematician, thanks to
sophisticated ‘snooping technologies,’ can pry columns of individual
data sets out of the computer and frequently within a short time.”341
According to Dammann, the critical question concerning the nature of
PII turns on the availability of “additional knowledge” (Zusatzwissen)
about the concerned individual.342
The European Union’s expansionist approach to PII is more in
tune with technology than is the United States’ reductionist approach.
It also has exercised significant international influence. In 1980, the
Privacy Guidelines of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) followed the recently enacted first federal
data protection law of Germany.343 These guidelines define personal
data as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable indi-
vidual (data subject).”344 The OECD Guidelines apply eight privacy
principles to all PII, and, in doing so, demonstrate the European
Union’s expansionist approach.345 Once there is PII, the OECD prin-
ciples are to be applied in full force. Like the OECD Guidelines, the
Privacy Framework of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation of 2004
defines PII as “any information about an identified or identifiable
individual.”346
Finally, Canadian privacy law reflects the influence of the
European Union’s approach, but goes even further in dropping the
concept of “identified” in its approach to PII. Canada’s federal pri-
vacy law, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act (PIPEDA), regulates the collection, use, and transfer
of personal information by private organizations.347 Enacted in 2000,
PIPEDA defines PII simply as “identifiable” information with the lim-
ited exceptions of “the name, title[,] or business address or telephone
number of an employee of an organization.”348 As a leading treatise
341 Id.
342 Id. § 2, marginal no. 26.
343 See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Guidelines
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD Doc.
C(80)58 Final (Sep. 23, 1980) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. The OECD is a group of
leading industrial countries, including the United States, and the OECD Guidelines
provide a non-binding framework for member nations. For a discussion of the OECD
Guidelines, see SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, IPL, supra note 52, at 997–98.
344 OECD Guidelines, supra note 343, § 1(b).
345 Id. §§ 7–14.
346 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC Privacy Framework, at ii-9, APEC Doc.
205.SO-01.2 (2005).
347 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2011, c. 5 § 3
(Can.) [hereinafter PIPEDA]. PIPEDA also regulates the use of personal information by
federal organizations and data flows between Canadian provinces. Id. §§ 23(1)–23(3).
348 Id. § 2(1).
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on Canadian privacy law summarizes the result, “[i]n essence, almost
any information in any form that can be attributed to an identified
individual is caught by this expansive definition.”349 The federal
Privacy Commissioner plays a key role in deciding whether informa-
tion is identifiable, and the general tendency has been expansionist.
As the Privacy Commissioner stated in his annual report to the
2001–2002 Parliament, “[t]he definition is deliberately broad, and in
my findings I have tended to interpret it as broadly as possible. . . . I
am inclined to regard information as personal even if there is the
smallest potential for it to be about an identifiable individual.”350
Notwithstanding its widespread adoption in other international
documents, the European Union’s expansionist approach is flawed
because it treats data about identifiable and identified persons as con-
ceptually equivalent. The difficulty is that there is a broad continuum
of identifiable information that includes different kinds of anonymous
or pseudonymous information. Different levels of effort will be
required to identify information, and varying risks are associated with
the possible identification of data. To place all such data into the same
conceptual category as data that currently relate to an identified
person is a blunt approach.
More specifically, this approach would lead to a hard trigger for
information privacy law. Consider merely two elements of the basic
toolkit of Fair Information Practices (FIPs):351 (1) notice, access, and
correction rights for the individual, and (2) security for personal
data.352 For information that merely relates to an identifiable person,
the law should not generally require that the entity that processes
349 BARBARA MCISAAK, Q.C. ET AL., THE LAW OF PRIVACY IN CANADA 4–7 (2011). See
1 PRIVACY LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR: AN ANNOTATION OF THE LEGISLATION IN
CANADA PIP-15 (Jeffrey A. Kaufman ed., 2007) (“It is, therefore, important to note at the
outset that the definition of ‘personal information’ [in PIPEDA] is extremely broad.”);
STEPHANIE PERRIN ET AL., THE PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION AND ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENTS ACT: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE 54 (2001) (“The definition in the Act is limit-
less in terms of what can be information about an identifiable individual.”).
350 GEORGE RADWANSKI, OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA,
ANNUAL REPORT TO PARLIAMENT 2001–2002, at 56 (2003). The term “identifiable” in
PIPEDA has been interpreted in case law. See Gordon v. Canada (Minister of Health),
2008 F.C. 258, para. 43 (Can.) (“[D]isclosure of the province field [of a form] would sub-
stantially increase the possibility that information about an indentifiable individual . . .
would fall into the hands of persons seeking . . . to identify ‘particular’ individuals.”);
Rousseau v. Wyndowe, 2008 F.C.A. 39, para. 44–45 (Can.) (holding that notes taken by a
doctor in the course of filling out a form during an independent medical examination are
“personal medical information,” a “subset of personal information”).
351 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (defining and describing the origins of
FIPs).
352 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7–11 (pro-
viding definitions and discussions of these two core principles of information privacy law).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\86-6\NYU603.txt unknown Seq: 64 28-NOV-11 15:01
December 2011] THE PII PROBLEM 1877
information provide a full panoply of notice, access, and correction
rights. Indeed, to do so might be counterproductive in many circum-
stances. It would require the data processing entity to first associate
merely identifiable data with an identified person, which would
thereby render it identified data.
3. The Benefits of PII 2.0
A benefit of having two different categories of PII, identified and
identifiable data, is to permit an assessment of the optimal nature of
legal protections. Rather than a hard “on-off” switch, this approach
allows for legal safeguards for both identified and identifiable infor-
mation—safeguards that permit tailored FIPs built around varying
levels of risk to individuals. Our model places information on a
continuum that begins with no risk of identification at one end, and
ends with identified individuals at the other. We divide this spectrum
into three categories, each with its own regulatory regime: under the
PII 2.0 model, information can be about an (1) identified, (2) identifi-
able, or (3) non-identifiable person. Our three categories divide up
this spectrum and provide different regimes of regulation for each.
Because these categories do not have hard boundaries, we define
them in terms of standards.
Information refers to an identified person when it singles out a
specific individual from others. Put differently, a person has been
identified when her identity is ascertained. There is general interna-
tional agreement about the content of this category, albeit not of the
implications of being placed in it. For example, in the United States,
the General Accounting Office, Office of Management and Budget,
and National Institute of Standards and Technology associate this con-
cept with information that distinguishes or traces a specific indi-
vidual’s identity.353 In Europe, the Article 29 Group states that a
person is identified “when, within a group of persons, he or she is
‘distinguished’ from all other members of the group.”354 In German
data protection law, as Dammann explains, “[t]he person is identified
353 ERIKA MCCALLISTER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., GUIDE TO
PROTECTING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII) 2-
1 (2010); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-536, PRIVACY: ALTERNATIVES
EXIST FOR ENHANCING PROTECTION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION 1 n.1
(2010); CLAY JOHNSON III, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESI-
DENT, M-07-16, SAFEGUARDING AGAINST AND RESPONDING TO THE BREACH OF PERSON-
ALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION 1 n.1 (2007).
354 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of
Personal Data at 12, 01248/07/EN/WP 136 (June 20, 2007).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\86-6\NYU603.txt unknown Seq: 65 28-NOV-11 15:01
1878 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:1814
when it is clear that the information refers to this person and not to
another.”355
Information in the middle of the risk continuum relates to an
identifiable individual when specific identification, while possible, is
not a significantly probable event. In other words, an individual is
identifiable when there is some non-remote possibility of future iden-
tification. The risk level for such information is low to moderate.
Information of this sort should be treated differently from an impor-
tant subcategory of nominally identifiable information, in which
linkage to a specific person has not yet been made, but where such a
connection is more likely. As we shall explain, such nominally identifi-
able data should be treated the same as identified data.
At the other end of the risk continuum, non-identifiable informa-
tion carries only a remote risk of identification. Such data cannot be
said to be relatable to a person, taking account of the means reason-
ably likely to be used for identification. In certain kinds of data sets,
for example, the original sample is so large that other information will
not enable the identification of individuals. An example would be
high-level information about the populations of the United States,
China, and Japan, and their relative access to telecommunications.356
There are certain instances where identifiable information should
be treated like information referring to an identified person.
Information that brings a substantial risk of identification of an indi-
vidual should also be treated as referring to an identified person. In
other words, identifiable data should be shifted to the identified cate-
gory when there is a significant probability that a party will make the
linkage or linkages necessary to identify a person. This essential sub-
category requires assessment of the means likely to be used by parties
with current or probable access to the information, as well as the addi-
tional data upon which they can draw. This test, like those for the
other categories, is a contextual one. It should consider factors such as
the lifetime for which information is to be stored, the likelihood of
future development of relevant technology, and parties’ incentives to
link identifiable data to a specific person.357
355 DAMMANN, supra note 338, § 2.3, ¶ 21.
356 The CIA’s World Factbook provides online access to such information. CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
357 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 354, at 15 (discussing the
need to take into account “all the means likely . . . to be used” by a data processor “to
single out” the individual and identify them (quoting Council Directive 95/46, ¶ 26, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC))).
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Practical tools also exist for assessing the risk of identification. In
fact, computer scientists have developed metrics for assessing the risk
of identifiability of information. For example, Khaled El Emam has
identified benchmarks for assessing the likelihood that de-identified
information can be linked to a specific person—that is, can be made
identifiable.358 The critical axes in El Emam’s work concern the “miti-
gating controls” available to parties in possession of information, and
the likely motives and capacity of outsiders who might seek to tie that
information to a person.359 In addition, computer scientists’ ongoing
work in developing more secure software offers useful lessons. The
relevant need is to focus on: (1) the nature of internal and external
threats to a data asset, and (2) the effectiveness of possible counter-
measures to those threats.360
In our next section, we will discuss how FIPs apply to the three
categories of PII 2.0 and how this model will encourage companies to
keep information in the least identifiable form possible. We then deal
with possible objections to PII 2.0 and conclude by applying our
model to behavioral marketing and digital marketing to children.
D. PII 2.0 and Fair Information Practices (FIPs)
In our reconceptualized notion of PII, the key is to think about
identification in terms of risk level. PII 2.0 conceives of identifiability
as a continuum of risk rather than as a simple dichotomy. A clear way
to demonstrate the functioning of this new approach is by considering
the applicability of FIPs.
The basic toolkit of FIPs includes the following:
358 See Khaled El Emam, Heuristics for De-Identifying Data, SECURITY & PRIVACY,
July/Aug. 2008, at 58; Khaled El Emam, Risk-Based De-Identification of Health Data,
SECURITY & PRIVACY, May/June 2010, at 64 [hereinafter El Emam, Risk-Based De-
Identification].
359 El Emam, Risk-Based De-Identification, supra note 358, at 66. See also ANN
CAVOUKIAN & KHALED EL EMAM, DISPELLING THE MYTHS SURROUNDING
DE-IDENTIFICATION: ANONYMIZATION REMAINS A STRONG TOOL FOR PRIVACY 13 (2011)
(“There are many tools available that mitigate the risk of re-identification of de-identified
information.”); Cynthia Dwork, A Firm Foundation for Privacy Data Analysis, 54
COMMC’NS OF THE ACM 86, 91–94 (2011) (developing the concept of “differential pri-
vacy,” a privacy guarantee that “revolves around hiding the presence or absence of a[ny]
single individual” or small group, thereby equalizing privacy risks for those included and
those not included in a database).
360 See MICHAEL HOWARD & STEVE LIPNER, THE SECURITY DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE
(2006) (discussing techniques for engineers to develop more secure software). Moreover,
Adam Shostack and Andrew Stewart have proposed that data security experts should ana-
lyze objective information about data breaches, draw on other fields, such as economics
and psychology, and use the scientific method in testing hypotheses. ADAM SHOSTACK &
ANDREW STEWART, THE NEW SCHOOL OF INFORMATION SECURITY 144–52 (2008).
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(1) limits on information use; (2) limits on data collection, also
termed data minimization; (3) limits on disclosure of personal infor-
mation; (4) collection and use only of information that is accurate,
relevant, and up-to-date (data quality principle); (5) notice, access,
and correction rights for the individual; (6) the creation of processing
systems that the concerned individual can know about and understand
(transparent processing systems); and (7) security for personal data.361
When information refers to an identified person, all of the FIPs
generally should apply.
To be sure, no single information privacy statute contains all
these principles in the same fashion or form. The precise content of
the resulting obligations will often differ based on the context of data
processing, the nature of the information collected, and the specific
legislative, regulatory, and organizational environment in which the
rules are formulated.362 Nonetheless, the basic idea is that all of the
FIPs should generally be available once a party processes information
that singles out a specific individual.
As for the category of identifiable, it is not appropriate to treat
such information as fully equivalent to identified. The information
does not yet refer to a specific person and may never do so.
Nonetheless, some protections are in order because there is a risk of
linkage to a specific individual. The question then becomes, which of
the FIPs should apply?
Full notice, access, and correction rights should not be granted to
an affected individual simply because identifiable data about her are
processed. For one thing, if the law created such interests, these obli-
gations would decrease rather than increase privacy by requiring that
all such data be associated with a specific person. This connection
would be necessary in order to allow that individual to exercise her
rights of notice, access, and correction. In this fashion, the law would
create a vicious circle that could transform identifiable data into iden-
tified data. Moreover, limits on information use, data minimalization,
and restrictions on information disclosure should not be applied
across the board to identifiable information. Such limits would be dis-
proportionate to risks from data use and also would cripple socially
productive uses of analytics that do not raise significant risks of indi-
vidual privacy harms.363
361 Schwartz, supra note 52, at 907.
362 On the development of privacy legislation in the United States, the classic study
remains REGAN, supra note 52, at 174–211.
363 At the Article 29 Working Party of the European Union, there recently has been
openness to a concept of proportionality in the use of information privacy law. See Article
29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2010 on the Principle of Accountability at 3,
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At the same time, some FIPs should apply to identifiable data.
The key FIPs are those that concern data security, transparency, and
data quality. Data security refers to the obligation to “protect against
unauthorized access to and use, destruction, modification, or disclo-
sure of personal information.”364 Identifiable information should be
subject to data security principles. Recall that identifiable data are
those for which a specific identification, while possible, is not a signifi-
cantly probable event. Yet these data, unlike non-identifiable informa-
tion, might be relatable to a person. Data security for identifiable
information, as for identified information, should be commensurate
with the nature of the information and the likely risks of disclosure.
As for transparency, this FIP calls for the creation of data
processing systems that are open and understandable to affected indi-
viduals. Transparency also means that tracking or surveillance should
not be done secretly. This FIP is important for identifiable data for
two reasons. First, openness about information use allows for
improved policies and law. As Louis Brandeis famously stated,
“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman.”365 Brandeis was also concerned about privacy, as
reflected first in his famous 1890 article with Samuel Warren, and later
in his opinions as a Supreme Court Justice.366 Yet, Brandeis’s atten-
tion to privacy for individuals was accompanied by his interest in open
flows of information about “social and industrial diseases.”367
Characteristic is his argument about the need for “publicity as a
remedy” for abusive practices among financial institutions and
bankers in the early twentieth century.368 In an analogous fashion,
behavioral marketing and food marketing to children are controver-
sial today, and there is a need for transparency about these emerging
practices.369
00062/10/EN/WP 173 (July 13, 2010). The question remains as to how successful this con-
cept will be in a system that treats identified and identifiable data as equivalents.
364 SOTTO, DESKBOOK, supra note 226, at 14-3.
365 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914).
366 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 13, at 193. The most famous of his opinions about
privacy as a Supreme Court Justice is his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928), in which he discusses the need for an expansive principle of privacy that adapts to
technological innovation.
367 BRANDEIS, supra note 365, at 92.
368 Id. at 101.
369 For more on Brandeis as a progressive advocate and his belief in public advocacy and
in shaping opinion, see generally Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis: Privacy and
Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (2010), which describes Brandeis’s commitment to the idea
that the public disclosure of wrongdoing is in the public service.
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Second, identifiable information can have great value. As we
have discussed, “stock-market-like exchanges” now exist around
information that is collected online.370 Some of this information may
fall into our category of identifiable data for which there is a substan-
tial risk of identification of a specific individual. Other data may be
merely identifiable. Transparency about the collection of identifiable
information will serve to heighten awareness about data flows among
all parties, both consumers and corporations. It will also improve the
position of consumers who have preferences about the collection and
further use of their data.
Finally, data quality is a FIP that requires organizations to engage
in good practices of information handling. This requirement depends
on the purpose for which information is to be processed. In the con-
text of identified data, for example, it means that the greater the
potential harm to individuals, the more precise that the data and its
processing must be. Some decisions matter more than others, how-
ever, and the stakes are low when the issue is whether or not one
receives a coupon for a dollar discount on a case of seltzer. More pre-
cision is required in a data system that decides whether or not one
receives a mortgage, and determines the interest rate associated with
it. In contexts where the decision to be made about a person based on
identified data is more important, or the harm to the person poten-
tially greater, there must be higher requirements for data quality.
In the context of identifiable information, data quality also
requires good practices of information handling. In particular, it
requires that companies pay attention to the handling of identifiable
information by third parties. If information is non-identifiable, a com-
pany can publicly release it or permit third parties access to it without
further obligations. We have used the example of comparative tele-
communications statistics for the U.S., China, and Japan. Another
example of non-identifiable information would be the information
presented in Google Flu Trends. As we have noted,371 Google Flu
Trends furthers early detection of influenza epidemics throughout the
world by monitoring health-seeking behavior, specifically the online
web search queries that millions of individuals submit to the Google
search engine each day.372 When one clicks on Google Flu Trends,
there is only high-level information that is safely aggregated.
370 See Angwin, supra note 190 (discussing the market for consumer profiles of Internet
users); supra notes 198–201 and accompanying text (discussing the billon-dollar industry of
behavioral marketing as practiced by popular websites).
371 See supra notes 304–07 and accompanying text.
372 See Ginsberg, supra note 304, at 1014.
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Identifiable information is capable of identification, even if this
risk is not significantly probable. Thus, companies cannot merely
release it or allow unmonitored access to it. Depending on the poten-
tial harm to individuals and the likely threat model, companies should
also be required to use a “track and audit” model for some identifi-
able information. An example would be information used in health
care research.373 Access to such data should be accompanied by obli-
gations that travel with the information. Companies that handle iden-
tifiable information can structure these obligations by associating
metadata, or information about information, with data sets.374
Thus, one benefit of PII 2.0 is that it tailors FIPs to whether infor-
mation is identified or identifiable. A further benefit of PII 2.0 is that
it creates an incentive for companies to keep information in the least
identifiable form. If we abandon PII, or treat identified and identifi-
able information as equivalents, companies will be less willing to
expend resources to keep data in the most de-identifiable state practi-
cable. As an illustration of such a disincentive in action, the European
Union’s Article 29 Group, an independent advisory body on privacy,
has articulated an “absolute certainty” test for ISPs and search engine
operators.375 Under that test, unless a company in this category can
demonstrate “with absolute certainty that the data correspond to
users that cannot be identified, it will have to treat all . . . information
as personal data, to be on the safe side.”376 The absolute certainty test
is not linked to a sense of proportionality regarding the risks associ-
ated with re-identification of seemingly non-identifiable information,
or of linking identifiable information to a specific person. In contrast,
PII 2.0 is more likely to motivate a company to invest resources in
maintaining information in either identifiable or non-identifiable
form. Companies can thereby benefit from FIPs that become easier to
comply with as they move along this continuum away from identified
information.
E. Possible Objections
What then are the possible objections to PII 2.0? From Ohm’s
perspective, the difficulty might be that the concept of PII is doomed
373 For a similar risk-based assessment of the threat of re-identification, see CAVOUKIAN
& EL EMAM, supra note 359, at 13.
374 See Schwartz, supra note 214, at 2077 (calling for the association of propertized per-
sonal information with non-personal metadata).
375 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 354, at 17; Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues Related to Search
Engines at 8, 00737/EN/WP 148 (Apr. 4, 2008) [hereinafter Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party, Opinion 1/2008].
376 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008, supra note 375, at 8.
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because the risk of identification can never be eliminated. From the
European Union’s perspective, the problem is that treating identifi-
able information as subject to a different level of protection than iden-
tified might open a back door for significant privacy violations. We
deal with each set of objections in turn and contrast them with PII 2.0.
As we have noted, Ohm views an attempt to define PII as being
as useless as expecting a successful outcome to the game of whack-a-
mole.377 Potential PII is everywhere, and attempts to predict where it
will appear, or in his metaphor, “pop right up,” are pointless.378 In our
view, however, computer science is developing metrics that are suit-
able for just this task. Where Ohm sees only chaos and whack-a-mole,
we think that a standard-based approach can be made operational and
predictable. It certainly will be as workable as the law’s recourse to
standards in other areas, such as the concept of “reasonable” behavior
in negligence law, or that of “access or acquisition of information” in
data breach notification law.
In tort law, the concept of reasonableness functions as a way for
juries to sift through an otherwise unordered universe of facts that are
potentially relevant each time an accident occurs.379 Only “unreason-
able” behavior can be said to be negligent, and a jury uses this stan-
dard, in focusing on various circumstances, as well as its shared sense
of the kinds of behavior that each person owes another.380 As a fur-
ther matter, tort law also demonstrates the capacity of standards to
generate rules in areas where consensus has emerged regarding the
required behavior. For example, insurance companies resolve respon-
sibility for most garden variety traffic accidents through use of bright-
line rules. In an analogous fashion, standards regarding the risks asso-
ciated with different processing of identifiable data may prove capable
of generating rules for more settled areas.
To shift from the common law to modern statutory regulation of a
high tech issue, we can consider data breach notification laws, which
have been enacted in forty-five states.381 These statutes typically
require that an individual be notified when there is evidence that an
377 See supra notes 286–87 and accompanying text.
378 Ohm, supra note 6, at 1742.
379 On the role of the jury in tort law as an institution for sifting and selecting the facts
that matter, see LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE 68–130 (2006).
380 For an introduction to the variable factors in concepts of reasonable and unreason-
able behavior in negligence determinations, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 169–285 (9th ed. 2008).
381 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 136–38. For leading data breach notification
laws, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2006) and 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.00–05
(2010).
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outside party has gained access to or acquired personal data.382 These
laws do not require a showing that a third party actually acquired or
gained control of the information.383 This standard has led to the
development of contextual benchmarks regarding relevant indices of
“access or acquisition” of information.384 No more is required for PII
2.0; here too, there is a need to develop norms that permit a tailored
response to a wide range of situations.
If “whack-a-mole” is ultimately not a convincing objection, Ohm
does develop a more successful critique of the technique that he terms
“release-and-forget.” He writes, “As the name suggests, when a data
administrator practices these techniques, she releases records—either
publicly, privately to a third party, or internally within her own organi-
zation—and then she forgets, meaning she makes no attempt to track
what happens to the records after release.”385 Ohm points out that
“release-and-forget” can be a prescription for privacy disaster. In our
view, it can be especially problematic in the absence of risk assess-
ment. Nonetheless, and unlike Ohm, we do not think that the current
arms race necessarily favors re-identification. Computer scientists
continue to seek to develop new and seemingly promising methods of
anonymizing data sets for research purposes.386 At the same time, we
also think that the sheer rate of technological change in this area
counsels introduction of a “track-and- audit” approach, as set out
above.
The European Union’s objection to PII 2.0 would be that it will
open a back door to privacy violations. In the words of the Article 29
Working Party, the goal must be to avoid “unduly restricting the inter-
pretation of the concept of personal data.”387 The fear is that any
other definition would narrow the jurisdictional sweep of the law. The
Article 29 Working Party has also conceded that “[t]he scope of the
382 See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 136 (providing examples of various
states’ data breach notification statutes).
383 Id.
384 As an example of such benchmarks, see CAL. OFFICE OF PRIVACY PROTECTION,
RECOMMENDED PRACTICES ON NOTICE OF SECURITY BREACHES INVOLVING PERSONAL
INFORMATION 12–13 (2009).
385 Ohm, supra note 6, at 1711–12. For a technical critique of ad hoc de-identification
and its shortcomings, see Dwork, supra note 359, at 86–89.
386 For an example of the different attempts to develop strong statistically-based
methods of de-identification, see Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Privacy and
Security: Myths and Fallacies of “Personally Identifiable Information,” 53 COMM. ACM 24
(2010). For an argument about how policymakers and legal scholars err by ignoring the
likelihood of an actual threat of re-identification of data as opposed to concentrating on
“the opportunities and motivations for the hypothetical adversary,” see Yakowitz, supra
note 156, manuscript at 22, 35–37.
387 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 354, at 5.
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data protection rules should not be overstretched.”388 Nonetheless, it
seeks to claim as much information as possible to be “personal
data”—as demonstrated, for example, in its “absolute certainty”
test.389 Once information is swept into this category, the Working
Party concedes the need for “a substantial degree of flexibility . . .
between protection of the data subject’s rights on the one side, and on
the other side the legitimate interests of data controllers, third parties
and the public interest.”390 The evidence is at best mixed regarding
whether such flexibility has, in fact, been forthcoming.391
In PII 2.0, by contrast, flexibility follows from a general associa-
tion of different FIPs with identified or identifiable information. An
additional safeguard is provided by treating identifiable information
with a substantial risk of being identified as a form of identified infor-
mation. At this point, the risk of being identified has grown too high.
Such an approach prevents tactical attempts to use readily-identifiable
data in lieu of identified data in order to avoid regulation and respon-
sibility. PII 2.0 addresses the European Union’s concern that regula-
tion might be skirted by drawing the boundaries too narrowly,
because it builds no hard line between identified and identifiable data,
and because this regulatory regime is not all-or-nothing.
F. Applying the New Concept
In this final section, we wish to apply our definitions of PII to the
two areas on which this Article focuses: behavioral marketing to
adults and food marketing to youth. Regarding the former, PII 2.0
388 Id. at 5.
389 Id. at 17. Regarding ISPs, the Article 29 Working Party has stated that “unless the
Internet Service Provider is in a position to distinguish with absolute certainty that the data
correspond to users that cannot be identified, it will have to treat all IP information as
personal data to be on the safe side.” Id.
390 Id. at 4–5.
391 On the Article 29 Working Party’s sweeping definition of PII in the use of Radio
Frequency ID (RFID) tags and highly detailed follow up requirements for Privacy Impact
Assessments for all uses of RFID, see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion
9/2011 on the Revised Industry Proposal for a Privacy and Data Protection Impact
Assessment Framework for RFID Applications, 00327/11/EN/WP 180 (Feb. 11, 2011);
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2010 on the Industry Proposal for a
Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications, 00066/
10/EN/WP 175 (July 13, 2010); Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working
Document on Data Protection Issues Related to RFID Technology, 10107/05/EN/WP 105
(Jan. 19, 2005); E.U. Data Protection Directive, supra note 333. There have been com-
plaints in the European Union that the broad definition of personal data has led to restric-
tive policies and procedures that have limited medical and social science research. For a
recent objection along these lines in a paper that is part of the “Data Protection and the
Open Society Project” in the United Kingdom, see David Erdos, Stuck in the Thicket?
Social Research Under the First Data Protection Principle, 19 INT’L J.L. & INF. TECH. 133
(2011).
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leads to a contextual analysis of the data used in behavioral mar-
keting. In many instances, the information now being gathered is in
fact identified, not merely identifiable. Since falling into this category
will bring regulatory burdens with it, companies will seek to invest in
technologies that truly make identification of personal data less likely.
The PII 2.0 model also will promote heightened disclosure of commer-
cial practices and demonstrate limits in both the FTC’s current
approach and the current legal regime. Finally, we point to flawed def-
initions of PII in the current policy debate about “Do Not Track” and
a general privacy statute. We also argue that PII 2.0 will encourage
data trade on terms more favorable to those consumers who wish to
participate in it.
Regarding food marketing to young persons, PII 2.0 will be rele-
vant to COPPA and beyond. In cases where behavioral marketing
involves collection of information with significant risk of identification
of a specific child, the full protections of COPPA will apply. Thus, a
benefit of PII 2.0 would be to block marketing companies from col-
lecting identified information from young children in the absence of
parental consent. Due to certain limitations on COPPA, however, the
FTC’s transparency jurisprudence will be needed to close significant
regulatory gaps.
1. Behavioral Marketing to Adults
As we have shown, behavioral marketing companies now track
individuals across different websites or digital media. These efforts
involve the use of tracking files being placed on a user’s computer
and, in some instances, include the sale of individuals’ information on
data exchanges. Companies have argued that they are not processing
PII because they associate their data with a unique identifier that is
not immediately associated with information such as a name, address,
or social security number.392
The information at the heart of targeted marketing is not non-
identifiable data. Indeed, the promise of these new forms of marketing
is to go beyond advertising’s past reliance on crude demographical
categories and to personalize marketing strategies down to the indi-
vidual level. Therefore, the critical issue will be whether behavioral
marketing implicates identified or identifiable data.
The necessary analysis in PII 2.0 should be contextual. Identified
information is present when a person’s identity has been ascertained,
or when there is a substantial risk of identification of a specific indi-
392 See supra Part III (explaining how marketing firms examine online behavior patterns
in order to target advertisements towards specific users).
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vidual. In contrast, identifiable information exists when such a specific
identification, while possible, is not significantly probable. Put differ-
ently, the question becomes whether the gathering of information pur-
suant to behavioral marketing, in a specific application, makes an
individual reasonably capable of being singled out from others and
linked to her identity. In such cases, the law should treat this informa-
tion as identified. In other cases, the information that is processed
may only be identifiable.
Under many circumstances, information gathered through
cookies or web beacons can easily be correlated through registration
data, connection with static IP addresses, or links with explicitly iden-
tifying information at other websites.393 Since falling into the category
of “identified” data traditionally brings greater regulatory scrutiny
and at least some enhanced legal burdens with it, PII 2.0 will
encourage companies to invest in technologies that reduce the risk of
identification of personal data. The goal would be to structure data
operations so that the possibility of identifying specific individuals
becomes truly remote, which will then lower the risk of data collection
and processing.
Beyond the benefits of PII 2.0’s contextual determination
regarding identified and identifiable information, we think that this
approach suggests four insights into the current privacy law landscape.
First, when behavioral marketing carries a significant risk of identifi-
cation of specific individuals, the same level of heightened disclosure
of a company’s practices should be required as in other circumstances
involving the collection of personal data. Since 2009, the FTC has
been developing a jurisprudence of transparency that finds companies’
failures to adequately disclose processing practices to be deceptive,
and hence legally actionable.394 Milestones in the development of this
concept are the FTC’s settlements in Sears (2009) and EchoMetrix
(2010), and its Consumer Privacy white paper (2010).395 The absence
of such transparency should be viewed as falling under the FTC’s
enforcement of unfair and deceptive practices.396
Second, PII 2.0 demonstrates certain limits in the FTC’s approach
and weaknesses in the current legal regime. PII 2.0 will likely lead to
393 See Angwin, supra note 190 (describing tracking companies’ ability to create robust
consumer profiles by combining information about users’ activities across different web-
sites); supra Part II (describing how markets can combine multiples pieces of non-PII to
create an identifiable profile).
394 For a discussion of the FTC’s role, see FTC, PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 2, at
69–78.
395 See supra notes 239–46 and accompanying text.
396 FTC, PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 12–13.
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at least some behavioral marketing being classified as involving identi-
fied information. Moreover, traditional privacy FIPs extend far
beyond providing only transparency to consumers.397 Yet, as the FTC
itself conceded in 2010, “the emphasis on notice and choice alone has
not sufficiently accounted for other widely recognized fair information
practices, such as access, collection limitation, purpose specification,
and assuring data quality and integrity.”398 The lack of a general
online privacy statute or a specific behavioral marketing statute leaves
questionable practices free of effective regulation. The new classifica-
tions of PII 2.0 thereby provide support for additional sectoral privacy
laws, a number of which have been introduced in Congress.399
Third, PII 2.0 also proves to be a useful concept in the current
debates around potential legislation. The discussion involves two
kinds of legislation: one concerns so-called Do Not Track, and the
other concerns a general privacy statute. As for Do Not Track,
Congress is now considering legislation that would give individuals the
ability to prevent the collection and use of data about their online
activities. While the potential for privacy protection is great, the pro-
posed legislation—the Rush Bill—adopts the flawed specific-types
approach to PII.
The Rush Bill adopts a rule-based approach to PII. It sets up an
initial category of “covered information,” including name, postal
address, and telephone number. To this category, it adds a second one,
which consists of “any other information” that is collected, used, or
disclosed “in connection” with these data.400 This approach turns on a
rule that excludes the current practices of behavioral marketing from
its reach. As we have discussed, targeted marketing does not collect
information “in connection” with name, postal address, and telephone
number.401 Yet, these practices can nonetheless collect identified
information in circumstances when there is a significant risk of linking
the data collected with a specific individual. Thus, from our viewpoint,
this Bill contains a significant flaw in the way that it sets its regulatory
threshold.
As for the possibility of a general privacy statute in the United
States, the leading candidate at present is the Commercial Privacy Bill
397 See Schwartz, supra note 52, at 907–08 (explaining that transparency to consumers is
only one of a handful of different types of obligations traditionally included in FIPs).
398 FTC, PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 20.
399 The latest such draft legislation concerns an online privacy bill of rights, as of yet
circulating only in draft form, that Senators John Kerry and John McCain are co-
sponsoring. Julia Angwin, Proposed Bill Would Put Curbs on Data Gathering, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 10, 2011, at B1.
400 H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. § 2(4)(A)(viii) (2010).
401 See supra Part III.
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of Rights Act of 2011, which Senators John Kerry and John McCain
have co-sponsored.402 The Bill employs the specific-types approach,
but its list of PII is extremely broad, including a catchall category of
“[a]ny other information concerning an individual that may reason-
ably be used by the party using, collecting, or storing that information
to identify that individual.”403 Through such language, this Bill resem-
bles the European Union’s expansionist approach.
Fourth, for identifiable information, this Article has proposed
obligations concerning data security, transparency, and data quality.
Under PII 2.0, companies will not be able to evade duties associated
with information collection and processing by rote arguments that the
data are not PII.404 In particular, we think greater transparency about
behavioral marketing, even when exclusively identifiable data are
involved, will stimulate data trade on terms more favorable to those
consumers who wish to participate in it. As an international example
of a related proposal, the Cabinet Office in the United Kingdom is
leading a consumer empowerment effort that includes its “mydata”
initiative.405 Its goal is to provide consumers with greater knowledge
about how organizations use their personal data. This knowledge is
envisioned as “an important stepping stone towards a world where
consumers make decisions on the basis of accurate information of
their past usage of a service and competitive offers made by
sellers.”406 As we have already argued, such increased transparency
will go far toward correcting the asymmetry of knowledge between
consumers and the companies that track their online behavior.407
402 Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011).
403 Id. § 3(5)(A)(vii).
404 See supra Part III.A.2 (describing how many companies have avoided regulation by
arguing that the information they collect does not violate privacy because it cannot be
linked to an individual’s name).
405 DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, BETTER CHOICES: BETTER DEALS 17–20
(2011).
406 Id. at 17.
407 Schwartz, supra note 214, at 2076–80. The treatment of both identified and identifi-
able information alike will heighten consumer awareness of behavioral marketing at a crit-
ical moment. The introduction of the concept of PII 2.0 occurs at a time when consumers
know little about behavioral marketing, but are also predisposed to be skeptical towards it.
Regarding the Americans’ skepticism toward industry practices, a 2009 survey by
Joseph Turow and associates revealed that a majority of Americans do not want marketers
to tailor advertisements to their interests. Joseph Turow et al., Americans Reject Tailored
Advertisement and Three Activities that Enable It, University of Pennsylvania Scholarly
Commons, 1–4 (2009), http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/137/. The results of the
Turow study suggest that greater transparency in this area will promote greater options for
consumers and more informed choice.
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2. Food Marketing to Youth
PII 2.0 will also have significant implications for food marketing
to youth. Under PII 2.0, whenever a marketing technique makes an
individual reasonably capable of being “singled out” from others and
linked to her identity, the law should treat this information as identi-
fied. In other cases, the information that is processed may only be
identifiable.
Consider the use of “digital command centers” in which staff
members of corporations interact with select consumers. Recall the
example of Gatorade’s “mission control center,” in which this com-
pany monitors social-media posts twenty-four hours a day.408
Although we do not know the precise nature of Gatorade’s activities,
it is not hard to imagine that this company and others are mining
social-media posts for information about the youth. Even if companies
gather the data in a way that does not involve children’s names, many
of these new digital command centers would fall within the scope of
PII 2.0 as involving identifiable information.
When behavioral marketing is directed toward children under age
thirteen, COPPA should fully apply in situations where either identi-
fied or identifiable information is involved. Congress’s purpose in
enacting COPPA was to provide a mechanism for parental consent
before companies could collect children’s personal information on the
Internet.409 Consistent with Congress’s intention, PII 2.0 would
update this policy and apply it to the new way of collecting data from
children, namely through behavioral tracking that follows Internet
activity. As a result, companies would no longer be able to argue that
they were not collecting PII about children because they did not have
access to a name. The FTC’s previous enforcement of COPPA against
those who fail to obtain parental consent has been vigorous, and its
history of large fines against parties who violate this statute will
ensure industry attention once it asserts jurisdiction over behavioral
marketing.
At the same time, however, PII 2.0 alone will not overcome cer-
tain shortcomings in COPPA. We have noted these above,410 and now
will merely summarize the statute’s weaknesses. First, the Act only
408 Bauerlein, supra note 265; supra notes 265–67 and accompanying text.
409 See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Commc’ns of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 105th Cong. 2 (1998)
(opening statement of Sen. Conrad Burns, Chairman, Subcomm. on Commc’ns of the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp.) (observing that as of June 1998, eighty-nine per-
cent of children’s websites collected personal information while only ten percent of the
sites provided parental control over collection and use of the information).
410 See supra notes 109–16 and accompanying text.
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applies to children under thirteen.411 Second, COPPA extends only to
a “website or online service,” and third, it regulates these entities only
when “directed” to children, or where the operator of the website has
“actual knowledge” that it is collecting personal data from children.412
These restrictions, and the limited vision of technology that they
imply, mean that COPPA—like grunge music and Beanie Babies—
remains entrenched in the 1990s.
Due to these limitations, the FTC’s transparency jurisprudence
will again have a role to play. Without overselling the benefits of such
heightened disclosure, we do wish to disagree with stereotypes con-
cerning the Facebook generation’s lack of concern about privacy.
Indeed, in a 2010 survey, Christopher Hoofnagle and co-authors actu-
ally found a high level of concern about this topic among young
people.413 A large majority of young people also believe that an indi-
vidual should have legal rights to know the information that websites
have about her and to require them to delete all such stored
information.414
PII 2.0 would invoke greater transparency about marketing to
youth. The FTC’s EchoMetrix settlement points a way forward. Recall
that the FTC complaint in that case concerned a company’s secret use
of parental control software to collect data about children’s computer
activity and to feed it to marketers.415 The FTC did not bring an
enforcement action under COPPA; its theory of the case was one of
“inadequate disclosure”—a theory that it advanced even though the
company supplied language to its customers that arguably covered the
underlying activity.416 Expansion of EchoMetrix to the larger digital
tracking environment through PII 2.0 will force companies to provide
greater information to consumers about the scope and nature of these
activities.
411 15 U.S.C. § 6501(1) (2006).
412 Id. §§ 6501(2)(A), 6502(a)(1).
413 Chris Hoofnagle et al., How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults when It
Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes & Policies (Apr. 14, 2010), www.ftc.gov/os/
comments/copparulerev2010/547597-00005-54505.pdf.
414 Id. at 15–16. Finally, Hoofnagle and his co-authors argue, “the savvy that many attri-
bute to younger individuals about the online environment doesn’t appear to translate to
privacy knowledge.” Id. at 17. The survey found that higher proportions of young adults
than older ones “believe incorrectly that the law protects their privacy online and offline
more than it actually does.” Id. at 4.
415 See supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text; Complaint for Permanent Injunction
and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. EchoMetrix, Inc., No. CV10-5516 ¶¶ 8–14 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 30, 2010).
416 Id. ¶ 12 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010). The critical information was both buried in a
Terms of Service notice and obscure in its phrasing. Id.
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Thus, one aspect of a response to food marketing to children
should rely on a transparency approach. The need is for greater infor-
mation to be granted to youth and parents about how companies
gather PII in the new digital marketing landscape. At the same time,
however, transparency alone does not represent a full range of FIPs as
they are traditionally understood, and marketing campaigns directed
toward youth and adults will sometimes occur without collecting PII,
even under our new definition.
On a concluding note, we wish to observe that information pri-
vacy law cannot solve all the social issues associated with food mar-
keting to children. There is a need, for example, to draw on consumer
protection law and public health law. While an examination of this
topic is beyond the scope of this Article, we can simply observe that,
fortunately, a broad and multi-pronged public policy effort is now
being directed toward this issue. The highest profile participant in the
debate is First Lady Michelle Obama, who is directing the nation’s
attention to the many dimensions of this public health crisis.417 At the
federal interagency level, a working group is developing nutrition
principles to guide industry when it markets foods to children ages
twelve to seventeen years old.418 The FTC, Food and Drug
Administration, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and
United States Department of Agriculture are the agencies involved in
this effort “to improve the nutritional profile of foods marketed to
children.”419
CONCLUSION
Personally identifiable information (PII) is one of the central con-
cepts in information privacy regulation. The basic assumption behind
relevant statutes is that their applicability will turn on the presence or
absence of PII. At the same time, and surprisingly, there is no uniform
definition of PII in information privacy law. Moreover, the definitions
that do exist are unsatisfactory.
417 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & William Neuman, Restaurant Nutrition Draws Focus of First
Lady, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2011, at A11.
418 INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON FOOD MARKETED TO CHILDREN (Apr. 2011),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/04/110428foodmarketproposedguide.pdf.
419 Id. at 1. As the New York Times summarized the new guidelines, “[r]egulators are
asking food makers and restaurant companies to make a choice: make your products
healthier or stop advertising them to youngsters.” William Neuman, U.S. Seeks New Limits
on Food Ads for Children, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2011, at B1. Public health advocates have
also developed a sound methodology of possible regulatory approaches. In one of the most
useful, that of the Berkeley Media Studies Group, policy strategies are targeted along the
concepts of the “four P’s”: products, places, promotions, and price. BERKELEY MEDIA
STUDIES GRP., FIGHTING JUNK FOOD MARKETING FOR KIDS 18 (2006).
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In response, this Article has developed a new concept of PII. Its
model of PII 2.0 protects information that relates either to an identi-
fied or identifiable person, and associates different legal interests with
each category. This flexible approach provides the safeguard of
treating identifiable information that has a substantial risk of being
identified as a form of identified data. Additionally, such an approach
has the merit of preventing tactical attempts to use readily identifiable
data in lieu of identified data in order to avoid regulation and
responsibility.
PII 2.0 represents a way beyond the reductionist reading of PII in
the United States and the expansionist reading in the European
Union. Its use would represent a significant step forward in
responding to the privacy implications of behavioral marketing gener-
ally, as well as the marketing of unhealthy food products to youth,
specifically. In this Article we have argued that PII cannot be aban-
doned, as this concept is essential to defining regulatory boundaries.
At the same time, however, information privacy law faces limits in its
policy reach. Other kinds of law and additional policy initiatives are
needed as part of a response in public policy to the negative implica-
tions of the food industry’s marketing techniques.
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